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Substitute and Complement Theories of Judicial Review 
DAVID LANDAU* 
Constitutional theory has hypothesized two distinct and contradictory ways in which 
judicial review may interact with external political and social support. One line of 
scholarship has argued that judicial review and external support are substitutes. 
Thus, “political safeguard” theorists of American federalism and the separation of 
powers argue that these constitutional values are enforced through the political 
branches, making judicial review unnecessary. However, a separate line of work, 
mostly composed of social scientists examining rights issues, argues that the rela-
tionship between courts and outside support is complementary—judges are unlikely 
to succeed in their projects unless they have sufficient assistance from political and 
social actors. The coexistence of these two different theories, which has gone un-
noticed by scholars, has important implications for both U.S. and comparative con-
stitutional theory. Close examination demonstrates that the simple classifications 
suggested in existing work—that the substitute logic applies to constitutional struc-
ture while the complement logic applies to rights, for example—are incorrect. In-
stead, courts face a much more complex reality, with both logics being distributed 
broadly across a range of issues, forms of support, and contexts. To be successful, 
courts must maximize their relationship with their external support structures, both 
by targeting issues where levels of support render review neither futile nor redun-
dant, and by shaping their judgments to increase the amount of support they receive 
from political, civil society, and international actors. This Article draws on numer-
ous examples drawn from both established and new democracies to demonstrate the 
plausibility of these tasks, and ultimately to highlight the utility of a theory of judicial 
review that emphasizes judicial consideration of external support. 
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INTRODUCTION 
While recent constitutional scholarship has been obsessed with methodologies of 
constitutional interpretation like textualism and originalism, a venerable tradition in 
constitutional theory analyzes the relationship between courts and a range of external 
actors including political institutions and civil society groups. However, the fact that 
this scholarship breaks down into two sets of theories with exactly opposing logic 
has been overlooked by existing scholarship.  
A long line of work, focusing largely on the structural parts of the Constitution, 
has argued that judicial review and extrajudicial enforcement function as substitutes: 
courts are needed when extrajudicial safeguards are weak, but as these safeguards 
strengthen, the constitutional principle becomes self-enforcing and courts are redun-
dant. In contrast, a separate line of scholarship, largely conducted by social scientists 
and focused on rights, posits that judicial review and extrajudicial support are com-
plements. Under this theory, judicial review is unlikely to succeed when external 
supports for a court are weak, but becomes increasingly plausible as a court gains 
more support from extrajudicial actors.  
Each of these theoretical families has a rich pedigree and includes a wide variety 
of work, all sharing the same essential logic. For example, the substitute theory in-
cludes much of the “political safeguards” literature on federalism and the separation 
of powers.1 Similarly, much important work on the relationship between law and 
social change adopts the complement logic.2 The juxtaposition of these two theories, 
through numerous examples drawn from both inside and outside the United States, 
helps to illuminate issues in both U.S. constitutional law and theory and comparative 
constitutional law.  
                                                                                                             
 
 1. See, e.g., JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS: 
A FUNCTIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT (1980); Herbert 
Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition 
and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954).  
 2. See, e.g., CHARLES R. EPP, THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: LAWYERS, ACTIVISTS, AND 
SUPREME COURTS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (1998); GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE 
HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (2d ed. 2008).  
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First, it tends to destabilize claims about the kinds of circumstances in which each 
kind of logic is likely to hold sway. For example, much existing work in American 
constitutional law seems to work off of the assumption that issues in structural con-
stitutional law are likely to be governed by the substitute logic, while issues of rights 
are likely to be governed by the complement logic. But a close examination shows 
that this claim is unpersuasive.3 It is plausible that some rights are effectively self-
enforcing through the political process and thus that judicial review protecting these 
rights would be redundant. It is likewise plausible that for many structural issues, the 
existing equilibrium is quite far from the constitutionally intended equilibrium, but 
attempts by the judiciary to remedy the situation are likely to be futile because the 
Court has little external political or social support. Thus, at least some rights issues 
may be governed by the substitute logic, and many structural issues are likely gov-
erned by the complement logic. The kind of theory that best describes a given legal 
problem will be identified by the particular political configuration of that problem, 
rather than by the more sweeping claims about its classification that tend to dominate 
U.S. constitutional law.  
More ambitiously, a reconciliation between the substitute and complement theo-
ries points towards a theory of judicial role that puts the relationship between courts 
and their sources of external support at its center. To maximize the gain from judicial 
review, courts can potentially “target” it towards issues where external support is 
neither too scarce to make their work futile nor so pervasive so as to make their 
actions redundant.4 The idea of targeting judicial review has been underexplored in 
the literature—little work, even in the United States, has studied whether courts and 
scholars are capable of identifying issues where judicial review is likely to be either 
impossible or unnecessary, or whether these assertions are empirically ungrounded 
ones that mask normative preferences derived elsewhere. 
Courts also have a significant—albeit limited—power to influence their political 
and social environments to construct and empower potential sources of support. 
Thus, if courts currently lack enough support to carry out exercises of judicial review, 
they may be able to shape their decisions to construct that support. Through these 
techniques, they may also be able to help construct support structures that will even-
tually make a given issue largely self-enforcing, rendering future exercises of judicial 
review unnecessary. Scholars have not paid enough attention to the range of tech-
niques that courts can use to construct this support and the circumstances under 
which they might work.5 For example, courts can calibrate decisions to split political 
coalitions, thus peeling off potential political allies. They can help to organize and 
empower civil society, and they can define the group of potential beneficiaries from 
their decisions in ways that will influence the size of the coalition protecting their 
work. Finally, they can craft decisions to draw in support from international actors, 
which may be helpful in situations where domestic support is scarce.  
These techniques should be central to the analysis of judicial review in any con-
text, both inside and outside the United States, and in developed and developing de-
mocracies. But one of their uses is in shedding light on the way in which courts might 
                                                                                                             
 
 3. See infra Part II.A.  
 4. See infra Part III.  
 5. See infra Part IV.A. 
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work to gain power in new or so-called “fragile” democracies. Recent scholarship by 
Samuel Issacharoff has argued that courts should aggressively work to defend their 
emerging democratic orders against potential threats.6 Stephen Gardbaum and others 
have challenged this reasoning, arguing that courts should instead take a relatively 
deferential view and focus on “weak” forms of review.7 The analysis in this Article 
does not resolve this important debate, but it does suggest that the answers are likely 
to be contextual, and will depend in large part on a court’s ability to target judicial 
review towards questions where it is likely to be successful and to construct the 
sources of support that it needs.8 Thus, scholars interested in the success of judicial 
review in difficult contexts must turn their attention to these questions.  
The rest of this Article is organized as follows: Part I introduces the substitute and 
complement theories of judicial review, explaining their basic logic and giving ex-
amples of scholarship drawing on each tradition. Part II works to reconcile the two 
theories—it rejects as unpersuasive a series of classifications based on rights versus 
structure, political versus social forms of support, and developed versus developing 
democracies. Instead, the two logics are likely to be ubiquitous across a range of 
problems and legal orders, depending on the specific political context that holds in 
that area. Part III interrogates the possibility of targeting judicial review towards 
problems on which it is likely to be neither futile nor redundant. Targeting is likely 
to be difficult, but is plausible—and thus worth more study—in some cases in both 
American and comparative constitutional law. Part IV argues that the judicial con-
struction of political and social support structures should be central to the analysis of 
judicial review. It develops a typology of potential tactics, drawing off of numerous 
examples of judicial decision making from a range of different contexts. Finally, I 
conclude by arguing, somewhat ambitiously, that the insights into targeting and sup-
port building developed in this Article point towards a distinctive perspective on ju-
dicial review, which will prove useful across a wide range of legal orders.  
I. TWO THEORIES OF JUDICIAL REVIEW AND EXTERNAL SUPPORT 
A. Judicial Review and External Support as Substitutes:  
The Political Safeguards Theory 
Particularly in the modern period, a major theme of U.S scholarship has focused 
on the question of whether judicial review on structural questions—both separation 
of powers and federalism—is necessary. The basic theory is that because these as-
pects of the constitutional structure are already protected by other actors and institu-
tions, courts need not and should not intervene. In other words, judicial review and 
external support serve as substitutes in this model. When nonjudicial actors are al-
ready working to maintain a given aspect of the Constitution, courts should generally 
stay out of the way.  
                                                                                                             
 
 6. See SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF, FRAGILE DEMOCRACIES: CONTESTED POWER IN THE ERA OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS (2015).  
 7. See Stephen Gardbaum, Are Strong Constitutional Courts Always a Good Thing for 
New Democracies?, 53 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 285, 287–89 (2015). 
 8. See infra Part IV.B.  
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The general claim that the constitutional structure is primarily protected by non-
judicial actors goes back in U.S. theory to Madison, who famously claimed that the 
best guardian of liberty was “[a]mbition . . . made to counteract ambition.”9 However, 
the claim has become particularly widespread—indeed perhaps dominant 
—among scholars (and at times the Supreme Court) in the post–New Deal period. 
Herbert Wechsler, writing in the 1950s, noted that the Supreme Court had largely 
withdrawn from policing lines between the state and federal government.10 He justi-
fied this by pointing to aspects of the structure of the federal government (mostly in 
Congress) that already protected the values of federalism. In particular, he argued 
that senators’ selection as members of states induced them to protect state interests, 
and that even in the House of Representatives aspects of the design and procedural 
rules incentivized members of Congress to protect subnational interests.11 He argued 
that even the presidency, selected through the Electoral College, was frequently so-
licitous to state concerns.12  
The viability of Wechsler’s safeguards theory was widely criticized in the litera-
ture. Critics argued that the safeguards identified by Wechsler did not function ef-
fectively, particularly since the ratification of the Seventeenth Amendment, which 
replaced selection of senators by state legislatures with direct election. Some argued 
for example that he had identified mechanisms to protect particular interest groups 
identified with subnational politics, but not to protect state institutions as such.13 In-
deed, because federal officials would want to claim credit for solving problems 
brought to them by subnational interest groups, the mechanisms suggested by 
Wechsler might actually give them an incentive to bypass or undermine those insti-
tutions.14 Later work, however, identified a number of different amendments to 
Wechsler’s theory, while preserving the essential structure of the argument. 
Larry Kramer, for example, has argued that the structural safeguards of federalism 
were properly found in the nature of the party system, rather than in national-level 
political institutions as such.15 His argument is that the decentralized nature of U.S. 
parties, with state-level organizations holding much of the power, has worked to en-
sure that those in national-level office work to advance the cause of federalism.16 
                                                                                                             
 
 9. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 349 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). 
 10. See Wechsler, supra note 1, at 560 (“[I]t is Congress rather than the Court that on the 
whole is vested with the ultimate authority for managing our federalism . . . .”).  
 11. See id. at 547–52. Wechsler’s argument also relied on a “mood” or “tradition” that 
“[n]ational action has . . . always been regarded as exceptional in our polity.” Id. at 544–45.  
 12. See id. at 557–58 (arguing that although the President is the “main repository of ‘na-
tional spirit,’” “both the mode of his selection and the future of his party require that he also 
be responsive to local values”).  
 13. See Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of Fed-
eralism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 215, 221–22 (2000).  
 14. See id. at 223–24 (noting that “[f]ederal politicians will want to earn the support and 
gratitude of local constituents by providing desired services themselves—through the federal 
government—rather than giving or sharing credit with state officials.”). 
 15. See id. at 278; see also Larry Kramer, Understanding Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 
1485, 1520–42 (1994) (exploring how American political parties act as vehicles for federalism 
values).  
 16. See Kramer, supra note 13, at 278–79 (noting that political parties in the United States 
are both not particularly programmatic and noncentralized, which allows members of state and 
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Subsequent scholars have proposed alternative mechanisms, including the separation 
of powers,17 the nature of campaign finance,18 and legislative solutions such as the 
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (“Act”),19 as other ways in which nonjudicial insti-
tutions ensure the achievement of federalism values.20  
Most scholars making these arguments also call for little or no role for judicial 
review in enforcing federalism. Modern works have tended to criticize the Court’s 
ongoing revival of judicially enforceable limits in this area. The clearest statement 
perhaps is found from Jesse Choper, who has argued in his “federalism proposal” that  
[t]he federal judiciary should not decide constitutional questions respect-
ing the ultimate power of the national government vis-à-vis the states; 
rather, the constitutional issue of whether federal action is beyond the 
authority of the central government and thus violates “states’ rights” 
should be treated as non-justiciable, final resolution being relegated to 
the political branches—i.e., Congress and the President.21  
But Choper’s recommendation is echoed by Kramer and most other modern scholars 
who explicate “political safeguards” of federalism.22 
A very similar approach has long been important on the question of separation of 
powers. Madison’s account is most directly applicable here—he laid out a theory of 
the Constitution by which the different national institutions would jealously guard 
their own prerogatives and take action against other institutions that attempted to 
aggrandize their own power.23 A number of scholars have taken his insight and built 
it into a theory of the division of powers at the national level. Choper, for example, 
again emphasizes the extent to which the President and Congress possess tools 
needed to protect their powers and punish attempts at incursion.24 Should the 
                                                                                                             
 
local networks to influence decision making at the national level).  
 17. See, e.g., Bradford R. Clark, Putting the Safeguards Back into the Political Safeguards 
of Federalism, 80 TEX. L. REV. 327, 335 (2001); Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as 
a Safeguard of Federalism, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1321 (2001).  
 18. See Garrick B. Pursley, The Campaign Finance Safeguards of Federalism, 63 EMORY 
L.J. 781, 819 (2014) (arguing that the nature of campaign finance was an important safeguard 
but that it had been imperiled by recent Supreme Court doctrine).  
 19. See Elizabeth Garrett, Enhancing the Political Safeguards of Federalism? The Un-
funded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 1113, 1115–16 (1997) (arguing that 
the Act and other framework statutes might themselves serve as structural safeguards by 
changing the way that Congress is forced to deliberate on issues involving states, and noting 
that scholars might direct more effort towards these statutes if they think existing political 
safeguards are insufficient).   
 20. This is not a complete list. For example, others have noted that bargaining between 
administrative actors at the state and federal levels is a part of the political process through 
which state interests are ordinarily (although not inevitably) protected. See, e.g., Erin Ryan, 
Negotiating Federalism, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1, 19 (2011).  
 21. CHOPER, supra note 1, at 175.  
 22. See, e.g., Kramer, supra note 13, at 287–93. 
 23. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison). 
 24. See CHOPER, supra note 1, at 276 (“Not only does Congress have powerful incentives 
to guard its prerogatives, but the President’s actions are limited by institutional inertia within 
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President attempt to exceed the scope of her powers by invading congressional com-
petences, for example, the Congress can use devices like congressional hearings, re-
fusals to fund, and informal levers of influence over the bureaucracy to take action.25 
Unsurprisingly, Choper’s “separation of powers” proposal mirrors his federalism 
proposal—except to protect judicial power (which is presumed to be unprotected by 
political mechanisms), he argues that judges should play no role in these disputes. In 
particular, he argues that they should be uninvolved in disputes between the President 
and Congress.26 More recently, Pozen has argued that national-level political institu-
tions can and do rely on a number of forms of self-help in circumstances where judi-
cial review is either unlikely or ineffective, while Posner and Vermeule claim that 
political restraints (chiefly public opinion) have replaced legal constraints as the ma-
jor check on executive power.27 
The “political safeguards” account has been most prominent in these two areas of 
U.S. structural constitutional law. But they have shown up in other areas, mostly but 
not entirely structural, as well. For example, while Choper argued that judicial pre-
rogatives were insufficiently protected by the political process and thus needed to be 
protected by court intervention,28 other recent work has challenged this account by 
arguing that both Congress and the President have in fact, on the historical record, 
had sufficient abilities and tools to preserve a strong, independent judiciary.29 Other 
scholars have recently argued that “horizontal” disputes between different states, as 
well as “vertical” disputes between states and the federal government, are effectively 
dealt with through political mechanisms, and there should be little need for judicial 
review.30  
                                                                                                             
 
the executive branch itself and by external political pressures ranging from party organiza-
tions, labor and business groups, and the press to the electorate as a whole.”). 
 25. See id. at 281–88 (discussing devices including the refusal to appropriate funds, the 
refusal to enact laws, the refusal to confirm appointments, and impeachment).  
 26. See id. at 263 (“The federal judiciary should not decide constitutional questions con-
cerning the respective powers of Congress and the President vis-à-vis one another; rather, the 
ultimate constitutional issues of whether executive action (or inaction) violates the preroga-
tives of Congress or whether legislative action (or inaction) transgresses the realm of the 
President should be held to be nonjusticiable, their final resolution to be remitted to the inter-
play of the national political process.”). 
 27. See ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND: AFTER THE 
MADISONIAN REPUBLIC 15–16 (2011); David E. Pozen, Self-Help and the Separation of Pow-
ers, 124 YALE L.J. 2 (2014).  
 28. See CHOPER, supra note 1 at 382–83.  
 29. See Tara Leigh Grove, The Article II Safeguards of Federal Jurisdiction, 112 COLUM. 
L. REV. 250, 253 (2012) (making a similar argument with respect to the executive branch, and 
marshalling historical evidence); Tara Leigh Grove, The Exceptions Clause as a Structural 
Safeguard, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 929, 944 (2013) (arguing that the exceptions clause of Article 
III protects rather than threatens Supreme Court jurisdiction because of the political incentives 
of national actors); Tara Leigh Grove, The Structural Safeguards of Federal Jurisdiction, 124 
HARV. L. REV. 869, 874 (2011) (exploring the ways in which the legislative process in 
Congress has protected Supreme Court jurisdiction).   
 30. See Heather K. Gerken & Ari Holtzblatt, The Political Safeguards of Horizontal Fed-
eralism, 113 MICH. L. REV. 57, 61 (2014).  
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Further, a significant element of post–New Deal rights enforcement can be seen 
through the same basic lens. The Carolene Products or representation-reinforcement 
theory of judicial review states essentially that courts should focus on protecting dis-
crete and insular minorities that are structurally excluded from effective representa-
tion in the political process.31 Other groups, which are better provided for through 
ordinary politics, need not receive judicial support. John Hart Ely argues that this 
process-based theory of judicial review is the best way to overcome the anti-
majoritarian nature of judicial review.32 At the same time, it also is based essentially 
on the “political safeguards” or substitute model: courts should ignore those consti-
tutional interests effectively protected through other means, and focus on those in-
terests without effective external support.  
More broadly still, the recent work on “popular constitutionalism” seems to rely 
in part on substitute-based reasoning. Authors working in this tradition present evi-
dence that there is a robust tradition of constitutional interpretation and application 
outside of the judiciary, for example in the Congress, the states, or among civil soci-
ety groups and the general public.33 Based on this evidence, many scholars argue for 
weakening the judicial role not just over certain areas of the Constitution, but over 
the entire text.34 Thus, some popular constitutionalism scholarship functions as a kind 
of “political safeguards” theory writ large: since U.S. constitutionalism is fairly se-
cure even absent judicial review, it should be either weakened or wholly eliminated.35  
In many ways, these safeguard accounts respond to the particular history of U.S. 
constitutional law. In particular, they tend to reflect a vision of the judicial role in the 
post–New Deal period. Prior to the New Deal, the Court actively policed the line 
                                                                                                             
 
 31. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (raising with-
out deciding the question of “whether prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be 
a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes 
ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly 
more searching judicial inquiry”).  
 32. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 75–77 
(1980).  
 33. See, e.g., LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITU-
TIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 7 (2004) (arguing that throughout much of American history, 
it was “‘the people themselves’—working through and responding to their agents in the 
government—who were responsible for seeing that . . . [the Constitution] was properly 
interpreted and implemented”); MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE 
COURTS 54–71 (1999) (arguing that Congress may be more capable of engaging in constitu-
tional interpretation than is often assumed, and that part of legislative inattention to 
constitutional matters can be ascribed to the incentive effects produced by judicial review); 
Jedidiah Purdy, Presidential Popular Constitutionalism, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 1837 (2009) 
(exploring ways in which presidents have over time engaged in constitutional interpretation).  
 34. See KRAMER, supra note 33, at 252 (rejecting judicial supremacy in favor of a depart-
mental theory of constitutional interpretation); TUSHNET, supra note 33, at 154 (calling for a 
“populist constitutional law” that rejects judicial supremacy and perhaps judicial review 
altogether). 
 35. See TUSHNET, supra note 33, at 99–102 (noting that the safeguards of federalism ar-
gument is one that rests on similar ideas of incentive compatibility to those in popular consti-
tutionalism, although arguing that the political safeguards argument rests on “controversial 
assessments of changeable political reality”).  
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between national and state power and issued (anti-) canonical decisions like Lochner 
that were perceived as frustrating the political process for the benefit of economically  
powerful actors.36 As is well known, the Court for a considerable period abandoned 
attempts to place limits on federal power vis-à-vis the states, and reoriented judicial 
review around the protection of politically disadvantaged groups.37 Scholars clearly 
developed safeguards theories partly as legitimation and encouragement of those ef-
forts.38 The Supreme Court itself has only sporadically embraced these theories in its 
decisions,39 and academic work has disagreed as to the extent to which both scholars 
and judges hold a consensus in favor of little or no judicial review on federalism and 
separation of powers questions.40 But the scholarly tradition stems in part from pe-
culiar U.S. questions about judicial role.  
At the same time, the logic of the model is extremely general, making it poten-
tially suitable for comparative exploration and use. Most existing work on the safe-
guards theory has fallen in one of three veins. A first set of scholars has been sym-
pathetic to the model, and has either applied it to some new area of doctrine or 
proposed a new set of mechanisms through which it might work. In federalism, for 
example, a long line of academic work has proposed different institutions or pro-
cesses which might be used to promote federalism values, often while critiquing the 
choices of their predecessors.41 A second vein of work has criticized the structural 
                                                                                                             
 
 36. See Jamal Greene, The Anticanon, 125 HARV. L. REV. 379, 417–22 (2011) (noting 
that Lochner v. New York is typically included in the short, core list of anticanonical cases 
decided by the U.S. Supreme Court).  
 37. See ELY, supra note 32, at 73–75 (defending decisions on this ground).  
 38. See, e.g., CHOPER, supra note 1, at 64–65 (arguing that the protection of individual 
rights for those “whose destinies were likely to be disregarded under a regime of simple ma-
jority rule” is the “paramount justification for judicial review”).  
 39. The most important embrace by a majority was in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan 
Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528, 552 (1985) (rejecting the traditional governmental functions 
doctrine developed in National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), because of the 
“effectiveness of the federal political process in preserving the States’ interests,” and citing to 
Wechsler and Choper among other authors). A majority of the Court later rejected the idea, 
notably in New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 181–82 (1992) (suggesting that the Court 
will continue to enforce constitutional limits related to federalism because it protects those 
limits not for the benefit of governments, but for the citizens of those states).  
 40. On federalism, compare Gerken & Holtzblatt, supra note 30 (noting that although a 
majority of the Supreme Court continues to intervene on federalism issues, the safeguards 
argument “has carried the day”), with John Yoo, The Judicial Safeguards of Federalism, 70 
S. CAL. L. REV. 1311, 1312 (1997) (arguing that the political safeguards approach is “no longer 
the controlling theory concerning judicial review of federalism questions”). On separation of 
powers, compare Daryl J. Levinson, Empire-Building Government in Constitutional Law, 118 
HARV. L. REV. 915, 950 (2005) (stating that both courts and scholars draw a “close analogy” 
between political safeguards approaches on federalism and separation of powers issues), with 
David A. O’Neil, The Political Safeguards of Executive Privilege, 60 VAND. L. REV. 1079, 
1106 (2007) (arguing that Supreme Court rulings “conclusively demonstrate the general re-
jection of the political-safeguards theory in controversies between Congress and the 
President”). 
 41. See, e.g., Clark, Putting the Safeguards Back, supra note 17, at 328–29 (arguing that 
existing structural safeguards theories failed to take account of the separation of powers); 
Kramer, supra note 13, at 278–79 (criticizing Wechsler’s model while proposing party politics 
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safeguards story, noting ways in which it may not hold either theoretically or empiri-
cally.42 In the separation of powers field, for example, scholars have sharply criti-
cized the Madisonian assumption that American political institutions will act aggres-
sively to check the ambitions of other institutions.43 The U.S. Congress in particular 
has often welcomed rather than resisted executive encroachment.44 Finally, a third 
set of academics has argued that the empirical truth of the political safeguards model 
is irrelevant—regardless of whether or not political safeguards exist, the Court must 
review structural safeguard issues.45 In particular, scholars have argued that the origi-
nal intent of the constitutional design left open a significant role for judicial review 
on these issues.46  
All of these lines of scholarship are heavily U.S.-centric, but my aim here is to 
highlight basic issues surrounding the theory of the model. In particular, these works 
invite scholars and courts to see judicial review and external sources of support as 
substitutes—judicial review is more necessary where less external support exists, and 
less necessary where there is more external support. Notice as well that in its broad 
form, the model does not define the form these external supports might take. Pre-
sumably, then, external support for constitutional values might come from a wide 
variety of political, or even nonpolitical, institutions and actors. While in U.S. con-
stitutional theory the main accounts revolve around national political institutions 
(like Congress or political parties), one could also build substitute models of review 
based on other sources like civil society groups or even international institutions. In 
sum, the model has both an explicit and implicit theory of how courts should target 
their efforts. The explicit part is that where other institutions are doing a sufficient 
job of protecting constitutional values, courts should avoid intervening.47 The 
                                                                                                             
 
as a mechanism).  
 42. See, e.g., Lynn A. Baker & Ernest A. Young, Federalism and the Double Standard of 
Judicial Review, 51 DUKE L.J. 75, 112–28 (2001) (criticizing the mechanisms identified by 
both Wechsler and Kramer on the grounds that they failed to prevent federal aggrandizement 
and did nothing about horizontal aggrandizement between states); Saikrishna B. Prakash & 
John C. Yoo, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Federalism Theories, 79 TEX. L. 
REV. 1459, 1488 (2001) (criticizing Kramer for failing to show that the protections he has 
identified are “exclusive or even adequate”).  
 43. See, e.g., Levinson, supra note 40, at 937 (arguing that both federalism and separation 
of powers-based safeguards theories may fail based on the fact that “there is little reason to 
believe that empire-building will be the dominant pattern of government behavior”); O’Neil, 
supra note 40, at 1119 (casting doubt on the assumption, in the executive privilege context, 
that Congress will have adequate incentives or tools to reach the proper constitutional resolu-
tion, and thus calling for a role for judicial review).  
 44. This is in part because multimember institutions like Congress are composed of a large 
number of actors, many or most of whose motivations may involve personal or party goals rather 
than the advancement of institutional goals. See Levinson, supra note 40, at 928–29.  
 45. See, e.g., Yoo, supra note 40, at 1313 (presenting evidence that the framers did not 
intend “the political process to be the exclusive safeguard of federalism”).  
 46. See, e.g., Prakash & Yoo, supra note 42, at 1463 (arguing that there is ample historical 
evidence that “many Framers generally assumed that judicial review would exist, that it could 
limit federal power that exceeded constitutional limits, and that the mere existence of political 
process safeguards did not preclude judicial review of the scope of federal power”).  
 47. The term “sufficient” of course is not self-evident, and the literature has suffered from 
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implicit part is that courts should instead emphasize other parts of the Constitution 
without such external support, since in those areas their work will achieve more.  
Stated this way, the model raises major questions about whether and when ade-
quate substitutes exist, and whether and how courts should respond to their existence. 
I treat those issues in more depth below. For now, it is sufficient to note an oddity: 
while modern U.S. structural constitutional law has been dominated by discussions 
of the substitute theory, rights discussions have at times been dominated by an ex-
actly contrary logic. In a story that is often told about rights, judicial review and 
external support are not substitutes, but complements, and less external support 
should be associated with less rather than more judicial review.  
B. Judicial Review and External Supports as Complements 
Longstanding work on judicial review suggests that judicial review and external 
support from political and social actors are better thought of as complements rather 
than supplements. The seminal works in this tradition are written from a law and 
social science perspective, and ask under what conditions courts can be effective in 
sparking social change. Most of this work has been done on rights rather than struc-
ture, but the claim again is general and is thus potentially useful for both American 
and comparative constitutional theory.  
A seminal work in this tradition is Charles Epp’s The Rights Revolution, which 
carried out a comparative study of judicial activism and public law litigation across 
several countries. Epp hypothesizes and presents support that the success of courts 
in carrying out projects to enforce constitutional rights is dependent on their “support 
structure”—the “financing, organizational support, and willing and able lawyers” 
who are able to access the courts repeatedly and push projects of rights protection.48 
Without this support, Epp argues, “judicially declared rights remain dead letters.”49  
Particularly telling is an analysis of the Indian Supreme Court. Epp argues that 
the court became highly activist on a wide range of rights issues after the late 1970s, 
but nonetheless that its impressive jurisprudence has resulted in only very modest 
achievements on the ground.50 For example, the court radically expanded access to 
the judiciary, accepting handwritten notes from indigent petitioners and newspaper 
articles as petitions.51 Its substantive jurisprudence recognized a range of new rights 
                                                                                                             
 
ambiguity on exactly which values it is attempting to protect. See, e.g., Lynn A. Baker, Putting 
the Safeguards Back into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 46 VILL. L. REV. 951, 954–
56 (2001) (noting that existing work fails to clearly distinguish between different kinds of 
threats to federalism values).  
 48. EPP, supra note 2, at 5. 
 49. Id.  
 50. See id. at 71 (“The Indian Supreme Court clearly tried to spark a rights revolution— 
but little happened.” (emphasis in original)). 
 51. For accounts of the changes in standing and other achievements of the Indian Supreme 
Court, see, for example, P.N. Bhagwati, Judicial Activism and Public Interest Litigation, 23 
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 561, 574–76 (1985) (explaining changes in standing and remedy); 
Nick Robinson, Expanding Judiciaries: India and the Rise of the Good Governance Court, 8 
WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 1 (2009) (arguing that the Indian Supreme Court is a “good 
governance court” and that its justices have developed interventionist doctrines to respond to 
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for prisoners, women’s groups, and minorities. It began issuing creative and innova-
tive remedies, including structural injunctions and the ordering of large-scale inves-
tigations.52 Nonetheless, Epp argues that the court lacked an organized support struc-
ture from civil rights organizations, sources of financing, or the legal profession.53 In 
turn, this weakness has hindered the court’s ability to make a systematic difference 
because it is not being fed either a sufficient number of cases, or sufficiently strategic 
cases.54 Thus, while it has handed down landmark judgments on individual issues, 
its overall impact on areas like criminal procedure or women’s rights has been rather 
limited.55  
In the United States, in contrast, Epp argues that the rights projects of the Warren 
and Burger Courts were fueled by changes in the litigation structure and the creation 
of powerful, well-financed legal organizations dedicated to rights protection.56 These 
organizations put key issues on the Court’s radar and were able to capitalize on indi-
vidually important decisions by feeding the Court more cases.57 A court, then, can 
issue individually important decisions without a support structure, but such a struc-
ture is a significant part of what transforms these isolated decisions into a program 
that has a systemic impact on social change.  
Epp’s argument focuses mostly on access to courts, but it should be obvious that 
the support structures explored by him can easily be expanded to many other roles in 
the litigation process, including the enforcement of judicial decisions. Indeed, in 
more recent work he has argued that the interaction of courts, civil rights lawyers and 
advocacy groups seeking to use litigation to force change, and proponents of reform 
within government agencies who themselves push these changes, are what have pro-
duced sweeping changes in the behavior and practice of both public and private bu-
reaucracies.58 For example, he explores the ways in which police litigation pushed 
by activists in the 1960s and 1970s, along with reformers within police departments, 
created new structures of “legalized accountability” in police departments after the 
1980s.59 Thus, supportive external actors—both inside and outside of government—
                                                                                                             
 
weaknesses in the political system).  
 52. See EPP, supra note 2, at 85–87.  
 53. Such a structure developed only briefly, during a period from 1975–1977 in which 
Prime Minister Indira Gandhi suspended ordinary democracy and ruled by emergency decree 
(the so-called “Emergency”), but these organizations, which were funded by wealthy oppo-
nents of the regime, largely withdrew support after it had ended. See id. at 109.  
 54. See id. at 103–08 (surveying the development of support structures in India on crimi-
nal procedure issues and women’s rights issues).  
 55. See id. at 108. Of course, other factors, including the large and fragmented nature of 
the court and its lack of docket control, are also plausible contributors. See Nick Robinson, 
Structure Matters: The Impact of Court Structure on the Indian and U.S. Supreme Courts, 61 
AM. J. COMP. L. 173 (2013) (arguing that both the size of the Indian Supreme Court and the 
fact that it sits in panels rather than plenary have had an important impact on its behavior).  
 56. See EPP, supra note 2, at 48–65.  
 57. See id. at 65–69.  
 58. See CHARLES R. EPP, MAKING RIGHTS REAL: ACTIVISTS, BUREAUCRATS, AND THE 
CREATION OF THE LEGALISTIC STATE 15–20 (2009) (exploring the ways in which fear of litiga-
tion liability catalyzed outside reformers and reformers within the bureaucracy to construct 
new forms of legal accountability within bureaucratic structures).  
 59. See id. at 93–94 (arguing that this process of interaction created “deep institutional 
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were critical in producing programmatic compliance with judicial decisions, as well 
as in sending cases to the judiciary. 
Indeed, Epp’s argument is embedded in a much larger body of work about the 
ways in which courts are dependent on outside actors in order to carry out successful 
programs of rights litigation. Much work on structural litigation, for example, sug-
gests that structural injunctions on issues like school desegregation and prison reform 
have been more likely to succeed when courts have the support of sympathetic actors 
such as government officials and civil society groups.60 These actors perform a num-
ber of different but interrelated functions, such as expanding the information-
gathering capacity of courts, developing innovative solutions to problems, monitor-
ing compliance, cajoling recalcitrant arms of the bureaucracy, and bringing problems 
to the court’s attention.61  
This literature seems to have at least two major subparts. One, exemplified by 
Gerald Rosenberg’s famous book The Hollow Hope, argues that the American judi-
ciary has been ineffective in carrying out major projects of social change because 
courts are highly “constrained” institutions that both have only limited independence 
from other political actors and are dependent on other political or social actors to 
enforce their decisions.62 Rosenberg suggests that in some circumstances, these con-
straints can be overcome, where there is significant political support for reform pro-
jects and where there are extra judicial actors willing and able to help with problems 
of enforcement and compliance.63 But, as Rosenberg argues, these are circumstances 
where significant change is likely to happen anyway, thus reducing judiciaries to a 
role “second[ing] the social reform acts of the other branches of government.”64 With 
respect to racial justice reform and school desegregation, for example, Rosenberg 
argues that Brown v. Board of Education and its progeny were relatively 
unimportant.65 The Court “reflected” pressure from a number of different social, 
                                                                                                             
 
reforms” including the creation of internal mechanisms for the investigation and sanctioning 
of policing abuses).  
 60. See, e.g., MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD L. RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING AND 
THE MODERN STATE: HOW THE COURTS REFORMED AMERICA’S PRISONS (1998) (exploring the 
ways in which courts worked with outside reformers and other groups to achieve significant 
reforms in several structural prison cases); Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabili-
zation Rights: How Public Law Litigation Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1015, 1077–79 (2004) 
(explaining the ways in which successful public law litigation can publicize significant prob-
lems and empower stakeholders that can then push forward the reformist project). 
 61. See David Landau, Political Institutions and Judicial Role in Comparative Constitu-
tional Law, 51 HARV. INT’L L.J. 319, 358–62 (2010) (exploring the ways in which constitu-
tional courts can use sympathetic civil society groups and state actors to monitor compliance 
and as a source of policy-relevant information).  
 62. See ROSENBERG, supra note 2, at 10–21.  
 63. See id. at 30–36 (hypothesizing that courts may overcome their constraints where (1) 
“other actors offer positive incentives to induce compliance,” (2) “other actors impose costs 
to induce compliance,” (3) “judicial decisions can be implemented by the market,” and (4) “by 
providing leverage, or a shield, cover, or excuse, for persons crucial to implementation who 
are willing to act”).  
 64. Id. at 422.  
 65. See 347 U.S. 483 (1954); ROSENBERG, supra note 2, at 169 (presenting evidence that 
a range of social, political, economic, and international factors were pushing towards the civil 
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economic, and political actors rather than “create[d]” it; “the changes in civil rights 
could plausibly have happened without Supreme Court action.”66 
Looked at in terms of this Article, Rosenberg’s insight combines the logic of the 
substitute and complement models. Indeed, his argument and evidence suggest that 
at least on certain issues, there is relatively little space between them. Courts are 
ineffective when they lack sufficient political and social support—judicial review 
and external support seem to serve as complements. But when they have significant 
amounts of such support, change is likely to occur anyway—judicial review and ex-
ternal support are effectively serving as substitutes. Thus, in most circumstances the 
added value of courts is small, and “U.S. courts can almost never be effective pro-
ducers of significant social reform.”67 The main risk of active courts, according to 
Rosenberg, is that they will act as “fly paper,” drawing in and wasting the energy of 
reformist individuals and groups who would be better served by devoting their ener-
gies to other aspects of the political process.68 
The other major subpart of this literature seeks to answer the challenge posed by 
Rosenberg, partially by suggesting ways in which courts themselves might impact 
their “support structure.” For example, judicial decisions and the litigation process, 
even if unsuccessful, may have a symbolic effect, serving as a rallying point for nas-
cent groups and helping them to first organize and then apply pressure through other 
channels.69 The judiciary’s ability to “catalyze” change by strengthening its support 
structure is a potentially important twist on the complement model.70 While courts 
are clearly dependent on their “support structure,” they may have at least some power 
to impact and strengthen that structure. Indeed, as I will argue below, this insight 
could be used to construct a more basic model of judicial review, which combines 
the logic of the substitute and complement models. In situations where courts face 
unpromising political and social environments, they can increase the probability that 
                                                                                                             
 
rights regardless of the Supreme Court’s role). Of course, this argument has been widely chal-
lenged, both in initial book reviews and subsequently. See, e.g., Stephen L. Carter, Do Courts 
Matter?, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1216, 1222 (1992) (stating that although Rosenberg may be right 
about the limited judicial ability to create social change, “courts can do a great deal to stymie 
change”); Malcom M. Feeley, Hollow Hopes, Flypaper, and Metaphors, 17 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 
745, 751–52 (1992) (arguing that Rosenberg’s model is incomplete and potentially incorrect, 
in part because it fails to account for various, more indirect ways in which courts can lead to 
change). 
 66. ROSENBERG, supra note 2, at 169.  
 67. Id. at 422.  
 68. See id. at 427 (arguing that courts may seduce proponents of social change by offering 
“only an illusion of change”).  
 69. See MICHAEL W. MCCANN, RIGHTS AT WORK: PAY EQUITY REFORM AND THE POLITICS 
OF LEGAL MOBILIZATION 279–82 (1994) (compiling evidence based on an in-depth study of 
gender pay equity reform in the United States that demonstrated that litigation served a number 
of purposes, most importantly in helping to raise rights consciousness and to build a move-
ment); see also César Rodríguez-Garavito, Beyond the Courtroom: The Impact of Judicial 
Activism on Socioeconomic Rights in Latin America, 89 TEX. L. REV. 1669, 1685–86 (2011) 
(differentiating “material” from “symbolic” effects of litigation). 
 70. See KATHARINE G. YOUNG, CONSTITUTING ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS 168 (2012) 
(arguing that courts should act “eclectically” in cases involving socioeconomic rights in order 
to develop a “catalytic role conception”). 
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their actions will have a broader impact by crafting and timing decisions to spark or 
strengthen a support structure. 
The general logic of the complement model is exactly opposed to the substitute 
or political process model. The support of other actors and groups does not make 
judicial review redundant, but rather identifies the conditions under which it can be 
effective. In other words, each theory suggests a logic for the targeting of judicial 
review, but the political safeguards theory suggests targeting topics and areas where 
external support does not exist, while the complement model suggests targeting areas 
where they are strong.  
II. RECONCILING THE THEORIES 
How might one reconcile these two contrasting theories of judicial review? In this 
Part, I reject the obvious claim (drawn straight from existing literature) that the sub-
stitute logic is likely to hold on structural issues, while the complement approach is 
likely to hold on rights issues. I also reject—not as irrelevant but as unlikely to hold 
in stark terms—a number of other possible divisions, including between support from 
political institutions and other forms of support (such as civil society support), and 
between more mature and less mature democratic legal systems. Instead, I argue that 
both the substitute and complement models are likely to hold across different times 
and different issues. In the next Part, I argue that theories of judicial review should 
be attentive to this insight, and that this attentiveness can help to construct a more 
general consideration of the enterprise based on a targeting function (judges inter-
vening in the right contexts) and a support-generating function (judges seeking to 
build up allies from the political, social, and international spheres). 
A. Rights vs. Structure 
A fairly common claim in the literature seems to be that the substitute theory of 
judicial review is mainly applicable to issues of constitutional structure. Thus virtu-
ally the entire “safeguards” theory in modern U.S. constitutional theory focuses on 
structural issues.71 Meanwhile, virtually all literature analyzing courts through the 
complement logic has focused on rights issues, particularly large-scale and high-
salience litigation projects aimed at spurring social change.72  
Yet a neat division of the problem into rights and structure breaks down, in fact 
fairly easily. First, the substitute logic can perhaps at times sensibly be applied to 
rights issues. The point, in fact, goes back to the “political process” family of theories 
spurred by footnote four in Carolene Products.73 That work suggests that some kinds 
of interests may be adequately protected by the political process, and these interests 
do not need as much, or any, judicial protection.74 The system of tiered levels of 
                                                                                                             
 
 71. See supra Part I.A.  
 72. See supra Part I.B.  
 73. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938); see also ELY, 
supra note 32, at 75–77 (elaborating a theory of judicial review in part from this insight). 
 74. The claim that the political process produces adequate outcomes for some kinds of 
rights issues, for example those involving economic interests, has been challenged by scholars 
who point out that interest group politics itself often produces distorted outcomes. See Cass R. 
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scrutiny for the equal protection clause, as an example, gives far more protection to 
some groups for differential treatment (race and gender) than it does for others (eco-
nomic interests).75 The claim can be read to say not that the Constitution does not 
protect these rights, but rather that they need not be protected by the judiciary because 
other avenues exist for their enforcement.76  
At both a theoretical and empirical level, at any rate, it is fairly easy to envisage 
rights that are self-enforcing or enforced through the political process, rather than 
primarily relying on judicial intervention. As Chilton and Versteeg point out, some 
rights are particularly likely to result in the construction of politically potent organi-
zations, and those organizations may push for more enjoyment of the right in ques-
tion, especially through the political process.77 The rights to form political parties 
and to unionize, as examples, may be particularly likely to result in the formation of 
organizations that can wield political power.78 These organizations, once formed, 
may help to safeguard the right at issue even without much judicial intervention.79  
Just as the substitute logic can be applied to rights, the complement logic can be 
applied to structure. Indeed, it is quite easy to show that the complement logic may 
                                                                                                             
 
Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29, 69 (1985) (calling 
for a “strengthened” rationality review in light of these distortions). Other scholarship suggests 
that the Carolene Products line gets things exactly backwards: “discrete and insular minori-
ties” may at times need less judicial protection, not more, because in theories of interest group 
politics, those characteristics can be significant organizational advantages. See Bruce A. 
Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713, 723 (1985); Daniel A. Farber 
& Philip P. Frickey, Is Carolene Products Dead? Reflections on Affirmative Action and the 
Dynamics of Civil Rights Legislation, 79 CAL. L. REV. 685, 700 (1991) (noting that these 
groups may find it easier to organize and assert political power under classic theories of inter-
est group politics). The point, at any rate, is not that the Carolene Products theory is right but 
simply that it suggests a logic about the self-enforcing nature of some constitutional rights 
issues. 
 75. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 488–91 (1955) (upholding 
economic regulations while applying only cursory scrutiny through the Equal Protection 
Clause).  
 76. Cf. Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism & Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. 
REV. 857, 858 (1999) (challenging the notion that “rights” have any independent existence 
from prudential and institutional considerations involved in constructing remedies for their 
violation).  
 77. See Adam S. Chilton & Mila Versteeg, Do Constitutional Rights Make a Difference?, 
60 AM. J. POL. SCI. 575 (2016).  
 78. The authors refer to this as a “theory of organizational rights.” See id.  
 79. To be clear, Chilton and Versteeg do not specify the mechanisms through which this 
self-enforcement occurs. Since much work suggests that organization and other resources aid 
litigation (just as they aid other mechanisms of political intervention), judicial intervention 
may be a key avenue of redress. But the fact that organization is also likely to increase political 
power suggests that the need for judicial review may decrease as political groups become more 
organized and thus more able to protect themselves politically. The empirical findings of 
Chilton and Versteeg, which are that organizational rights are more likely to matter over time 
than rights that do not tend to create organizational structures, tend to support the point. See 
id. at tbl.2 (finding based on statistical analysis that prior protection of organizational rights 
like political parties and unions increase actual enjoyment of those rights subsequently, but 
finding more mixed results for other rights).  
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commonly be applied to structural issues. The model of courts as potentially redun-
dant on structural issues is firmly embedded in the U.S. literature.80 Many of these 
arguments stem from James Madison’s suggestion that structure will be significantly 
self-enforcing if “ambition” is used to check “ambition.”81 In other words, the 
Madisonian conception depends in part on a world where each institution (the states, 
Congress, the President, etc.) will have the incentive and ability to block attempts by 
other institutions to overreach. Since all actors in the system have an incentive to 
expand their power, each will naturally be jealous of their prerogatives and will strike 
back against attempted encroachments.82  
The trouble is that structural relationships often do not look anything like this. 
Political institutions often do not “empire-build,” but may instead seek to abdicate 
large amounts of their own power.83 There are a number of reasons why political 
institutions may seek to give up their own institutional power (or at least be in-
different to it), rather than seek to build it up. Most importantly, political actors may 
seek goals other than the pursuit of institutional interests.84 For example, in a strong-
party system, actors may be motivated by the pursuit of partisan rather than institu-
tional ends, both in order to maximize their chances of reelection and to pursue policy 
goals.85 If these ends are maximized by a congressional majority giving up power to 
a president from the same party, one would expect that abdication to occur.86 This 
problem may be particularly acute in multimember bodies, like legislatures and 
courts.87 There, the many individuals that make up the body may often be able to 
advance their interests in a way that does not align with the broader institutional 
power of the body they constitute.88 And if many or even all members of a multi-
member body seek to empower it, there is still no guarantee that will be the outcome. 
Collective action problems, or other inefficiencies in aggregating results from the 
individual to the group level, may prevent coordination.89  
                                                                                                             
 
 80. See supra Part I.A.  
 81. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison).  
 82. For a modern version of this formulation, see CHOPER, supra note 1, at 175, 263 (ar-
guing that in the U.S. context, both different levels and branches of government have the abil-
ity and desire to block self-aggrandizing moves by other actors).  
 83. See Levinson, supra note 40, at 970.  
 84. See id. at 926–35 (explaining why elected politicians and bureaucrats often pursue 
other goals).  
 85. See Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 
HARV. L. REV. 2312, 2329–30 (2006) (arguing that in modern U.S. democracy, partisan mo-
tives outweigh institutional interests much of the time, and thus the separation of powers sys-
tem performs fundamentally differently under unified versus divided government).  
 86. See id. at 2352 (“If a partisan majority in Congress generally shares the President's 
ideological and policy goals, abdication might further the party's interest in uniting behind the 
President.”).  
 87. See ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE SYSTEM OF THE CONSTITUTION 41 (2011).  
 88. See Levinson, supra note 40, at 952–64 (exploring the motivations of members of 
Congress and judges and finding that these motives often diverge from those of institutional 
aggrandizement).  
 89. See VERMEULE, supra note 87, at 41 (noting the flaw in Madisonian logic of ignoring 
the collective action problem).  
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In circumstances where many institutions behave in a way that is relatively indif-
ferent to their own power, or actively seek to give it up rather than aggrandizing, the 
substitute model may do a poor job of analyzing the context in which judicial review 
occurs.90 If one institution has the incentives and ability to exceed its designated 
sphere of powers, others may, under certain circumstances, acquiesce or invite rather 
than fight this encroachment.91 If this happens routinely, there may be less reason to 
think that institutions themselves will automatically reach the constitutionally man-
dated balance of power. Instead, the interaction between branches and levels of gov-
ernment may result in an equilibrium that is radically different from the constitutional 
design.  
Indeed, under circumstances where many political institutions abdicate rather than 
preserve and protect their power, the complement model may do a better job of de-
scribing the political context.92 Judicial review may not plausibly be redundant in 
such circumstances, but rather doomed to fail because the court cannot gain any po-
litical support to aid in its projects. In other words, in contexts where some institu-
tions aggrandize their power and others abdicate or are indifferent to the expansion, 
it may well be true that institutions, left to their own devices, will distort rather than 
protect the structural constitutional design. But it may also be true that courts can do 
little on their own to rectify these distortions.  
My own recent work provides support for using a complement-based conceptu-
alization in many circumstances, at least outside of the United States. Courts func-
tioning in Latin America sometimes face separation of powers contexts gone awry, 
where presidents dominate policy making to a high degree, and legislatures are mar-
ginalized.93 In many of these circumstances, legislatures are complicit or indifferent 
in these arrangements, rather than fighting them.94 This is often because individual 
legislators, especially in weak-party systems, have incentives (such as the accumu-
lation of patronage resources or the advancement of post-legislative careers) that di-
verge sharply from those that would lead them to support institutional aggrandize-
ment.95 My research on Colombia suggests that even a determined court, issuing 
                                                                                                             
 
 90. The argument here is that many models of political safeguards seem to depend on 
Madisonian reasoning, not that all such models must do so. There may be versions of the 
political safeguards argument that can work within, or even depend on, some forms of institu-
tional abdication, but most existing work seems to depend on assumptions very much like 
Madison’s. See supra Part I.A.  
 91. See Levinson, supra note 40, at 957 (arguing that the true picture of modern U.S. 
constitutional law is one with “somewhat imperial modern presidents and stubbornly passive 
Congresses,” rather than “mutually rivalrous, self-aggrandizing branches”).  
 92. See supra Part I.B.  
 93. See Miguel Schor, Constitutionalism Through the Looking Glass of Latin America, 
41 TEX. INT’L L.J. 1, 3 (2006) (“Presidents are elected but often act and look much like the 
dictators or caudillos of the nineteenth century.”).  
 94. See Gary W. Cox & Scott Morgenstern, Epilogue: Latin America’s Reactive Assem-
blies and Proactive Presidents, in LEGISLATIVE POLITICS IN LATIN AMERICA 446, 467–68 
(Scott Morgenstern & Benito Nacif eds., 2002) (rejecting the thesis that Latin American leg-
islatures are unimportant but noting that they are “reactive,” and also noting that combinations 
of executive prerogatives and congressional acquiescence allow Latin American presidents to 
often “go much further than an American president would be able”).  
 95. See, e.g., Scott Mainwaring & Timothy R. Scully, Introduction: Party Systems in 
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sophisticated decisions and working persistently on an issue, had little prospect of 
success in rebalancing the separation of powers and reining in presidential power 
unless it enjoyed some other form of political or social support (from political parties, 
for example, or civil society groups) that could serve as an alternative to its lack of 
support from political institutions.96 In contrast, in the Mexican case where the court 
did have the support of a newly empowered legislature in the hands of strong oppo-
sition parties, its doctrines were arguably able to have an easier impact on the extent 
of presidential power.97  
It is possible, of course, that the context in the United States is different, and that 
here the substitute or political safeguards model is indeed the right one in most struc-
tural situations. But scholarship persuasively demonstrates that abdication rather than 
empire building is common behavior among U.S. political institutions (particularly 
Congress and the states) as well as political institutions outside of the United States.98 
This behavior is a predictable result of common institutional dynamics; it is not just 
a pathology of banana republics. And below I suggest reasons why the United States 
is unlikely to have a radically different distribution of “substitute” versus “comple-
ment” contexts than other legal systems.  
The fact that structural constitutional law in the United States, like structural con-
stitutional law elsewhere, is likely to contain many situations where the complement 
rather than substitute logic holds does not mean that any particular claim that a given 
area of law conforms to the political safeguards logic is wrong. Nor should a conclu-
sion that, upon second look, a given area does not have sufficient political safeguards 
necessarily be an invitation for U.S. courts to conduct aggressive judicial review in 
that area. The reason is simple: judicial review without significant political support 
may not be redundant, but it may well be hopeless.99 The complement model, in other 
words, may offer its own compelling reasons for avoiding judicial review of certain 
structural issues.  
At the same time, the straightforward logic laid out in this Part does suggest that 
something beyond empirical data may motivate the extraordinary popularity of po-
litical safeguards arguments in U.S. constitutional law. Critics have, of course, noted 
                                                                                                             
 
Latin America, in BUILDING DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS: PARTY SYSTEMS IN LATIN AMERICA 
1, 21–28 (Scott Mainwaring & Timothy R. Scully eds., 1995) (noting that noninstitutionalized 
party systems reduce the dependence of politicians on their parties and thus hinder governance 
and increase uncertainty); see also Landau, supra note 61, at 331–32 (noting that where parties 
are weak, legislatures are likely to lack both democratic accountability and institutional 
capacity).  
 96. See David Landau, Political Support and Structural Constitutional Law, 67 ALA. L. 
REV. 1069 (2016).  
 97. See id. For a general account of some of the case law on which this account draws, 
see Stephen T. Zamora & José Ramón Cossío, Mexican Constitutionalism After 
Presidencialismo, 4 INT’L J. CONST. L. 411 (2006).  
 98. See Levinson, supra note 40, at 957 (arguing that the U.S. Congress has often 
willingly abdicated its power and stating that “[s]eparation of powers scholars certainly rec-
ognize that Congress has fallen down on the job of empire-building in areas such as delegation 
and foreign affairs”); see also id. at 940–42 (making a similar argument with respect to state 
governments).  
 99. See supra Part I.B (discussing the logic of the argument that judicial review cannot 
work without courts having a certain amount of support from political or social actors).  
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that some of this work relies on vaguely specified political mechanisms and spends 
relatively little effort demonstrating that the specified mechanisms actually fulfill the 
values they purport to serve.100 Moreover, some scholarship pays little attention to 
measuring the proper constitutional distribution of power between levels and 
branches of government, or in other words, to the question of how one would know 
whether the political safeguards were working adequately.  
It is likely that some of this work serves as a justification for normative values 
developed in other ways. For example, it may be a defensible position to assert that 
structural constitutional review is a lower priority than rights review because it has a 
more contingent and uncertain relationship to human liberty or other fundamental 
values.101 It is also possible to argue that structural judicial review, on some topics, 
would be futile, either because of the complement logic laid out above or for other 
reasons like the lack of judicially manageable standards.102 But these positions 
should be asserted and evaluated directly, rather than retreated behind a political 
safeguards argument that rests on different logic. It seems difficult to sustain the po-
sition that structural constitutional review functions off of an essentially different 
logic from constitutional rights review. 
B. Political Institutions vs. Civil Society 
Existing scholarship also suggests a distinction between support provided by state 
institutions from that provided by nonstate actors such as civil society groups. Most 
of the work on substitute or political process theories seems to emphasize political 
support provided by governmental institutions like executives, legislatures, and po-
litical parties.103 In contrast, work that focuses on the relationship between social 
actors like civil society groups tends to emphasize the logic of the complement 
model.104 The intuition here may be that political support is stronger than that pro-
vided by other kinds of actors. Thus political forms of support can be strong enough 
to make judicial review redundant. Nonpolitical support may aid courts in carrying 
out their projects, but at the same time not be sufficiently strong so as to render judi-
cial review of a given topic unnecessary. 
But this claim again seems unlikely to hold up in a categorical way. It is easy to 
imagine cases where the complement logic exists with respect to governmental insti-
tutions. In the absence of governmental support, just as in the absence of other forms 
of support, judicial review may prove ineffective. Perhaps more to the point, it is 
easy to envision cases where some level of governmental support exists, but judicial 
review serves to augment the impact of that support. The Mexican case of 
                                                                                                             
 
 100. A sweeping critique is offered by Prakash & Yoo, supra note 42, at 1476–89 (critiqu-
ing the mechanisms identified in various existing “process” theories of federalism).  
 101. See, e.g., CHOPER, supra note 1, at 64 (“[T]he overriding virtue of and justification 
for vesting the Court with this awesome power [of judicial review] is to guard against govern-
mental infringement of individual liberties secured by the Constitution.”).  
 102. See, e.g., Kramer, supra note 13, at 288–89 (arguing that “[t]he practical difficulties 
of working out the limits of Congress's power through litigation are depressingly familiar, 
having been reproduced each time the Supreme Court has tried its hand at the problem”).  
 103. See supra Part I.A.  
 104. See supra Part I.B.  
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congressional-executive relations, noted above, may provide one interesting exam-
ple.105 Between the 1930s and the 1990s, the Mexican president dominated policy 
making in the country’s one-party state.106 As Mexico democratized, opposition par-
ties took control of the Congress and the party experienced divided government for 
the first time in a lifetime and began pushing for a larger role in the policy making 
process.107 But the president, aided by ambiguous constitutional language and tradi-
tion, continued to assert unilateral powers.108 By striking some of these assertions 
down, the Mexican Supreme Court to a degree aided the rebalancing of the separation 
of powers in the country, even if it was working alongside other political forces 
(namely the opposition political parties) pointing in the same direction.109  
Moreover, the claim that governmental forms of support are categorically stronger 
than nongovernmental forms fails to account for the complexity of relationships in 
this area. It does seem plausible that many forms of self-enforcement involve the 
state somehow. But the trigger or source of self-enforcement may still be nonstate 
actors like civil society groups, rather than (or in addition to) friendly institutions or 
politicians. As an example, imagine that the right to unionize proves largely self-
enforcing because it leads to the creation of politically powerful unions that work to 
protect and extend the right. The mechanisms through which this protection would 
work would likely go through the legislature and administrative state—the unions 
would use their political clout to win policy concessions from both branches of gov-
ernment, perhaps partially or totally vitiating the need for judicial review.110 But the 
ultimate source of self-enforcement would stem from civil society and not the state. 
C. The Rule of Law and Institutional Development 
Finally, some work focuses on the existence of the rule of law in demarcating the 
dividing line between substitute and complement logics. One possibility is that the 
key to sorting between these two theories is concerns about compliance: where courts 
are regularly disobeyed, their most basic task is to round up or identify sufficient 
support to make their orders effective. On the other hand, where compliance is much 
less problematic, redundancy may come to the fore as a bigger issue. Additionally, 
work in the popular constitutionalist vein argues that where political institutions are 
well functioning and there is a developed constitutional culture, nonjudicial actors 
                                                                                                             
 
 105. See supra text accompanying note 97.  
 106. See Jeffrey Weldon, Political Sources of Presidencialismo in Mexico, in 
PRESIDENTIALISM AND DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA 225 (Scott Mainwaring & Matthew 
Soberg Shugart eds., 1997) (noting that the Mexican president has historically “dominate[d] 
the legislative and judicial branches of the national government” and may be the most power-
ful executive in Latin America). 
 107. See Zamora & Cossío, supra note 97, at 416 (stating that the Mexican president has 
become the “supreme coalition builder” and “supreme veto wielder” rather than the “supreme 
legislator” as was the case previously).  
 108. See Landau, supra note 96.  
 109. See id.  
 110. Cf. MCCANN, supra note 69, at 280–81 (noting that pay-equity groups used the courts 
to increase mobilization, but later in the process sought policy concessions through the politi-
cal process without much involvement of the courts).  
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can more readily be counted on to carry out the constitutional project without a need 
for much judicial intervention.111 At a broader level, this suggests an argument that 
aspects of a system like well-functioning political institutions and salient constitu-
tional cultures make constitutional self-enforcement more likely, and may obviate 
the need for judicial review.  
Recent scholarship generally supports the point that differences in configurations 
of political institutions and constitutional culture should affect the judicial role.112 
And some of these differences may well have an impact on the necessity or futility 
of judicial review on various questions. But sweeping or categorical distinctions can-
not be based on the rule of law, developed versus developing political institutions, or 
the existence of political culture. 
Direct noncompliance is only a minor part of what drives the complement theory. 
The underlying question is not only whether courts can issue individual orders that 
will be enforced or ignored, but instead whether it is necessary or possible for them 
to intervene in order to cause change in complex political or social systems.113 In this 
broader sense, noncompliance becomes a significant issue even in systems where the 
rule of law is strong. 
 In order to have such a broader impact, courts need to rely on a chain of events 
that runs well beyond the enforcement of individual judicial orders. At times, both 
inside and outside of the United States, political actors comply with an individual 
decision but refuse to alter their practice for other identically situated cases. A dra-
matic example is the Supreme Court’s ruling in INS v. Chadha, where the Court left 
no doubt that “legislative vetoes”—by which one or both houses of Congress re-
served for themselves the power to overrule executive discretion within statutory 
programs—were unconstitutional in all circumstances because they did not abide by 
the constitutional procedures for bicameralism and presentment.114 The political 
branches of course complied with the judicial order on the particular facts involving 
Chadha (who was not deported), but in subsequent cases, Congress has continued to 
insert and rely on these vetoes, with the acquiescence of the executive branch.115 This 
problem may be particularly difficult where the bureaucracies or other institutions 
charged with enforcing a given order are varied rather than centralized. As a simple 
                                                                                                             
 
 111. See Mark Tushnet, The Relation Between Political Constitutionalism and Weak-Form 
Judicial Review, 14 GERMAN L.J. 2249, 2225–26 (2013) (laying out the conditions for “polit-
ical” rather than “legal” constitutionalism as including “widespread commitment among the 
nation’s citizens to constitutional values” and “vigorous party competition or a robust culture 
of intraparty discussion”).  
 112. See Daniel Bonilla Maldonado, Introduction: Toward a Constitutionalism of the 
Global South, in CONSTITUTIONALISM OF THE GLOBAL SOUTH: THE ACTIVIST TRIBUNALS OF 
INDIA, SOUTH AFRICA, AND COLOMBIA 1 (2013).  
 113.  See, e.g., ROSENBERG, supra note 2 (examining the ability of the U.S. Supreme Court 
to carry out social change across different areas, including abortion and school desegregation). 
 114. 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983) (holding that the legislative veto violated the Constitution 
by evading the Constitution’s “single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered procedure” 
for the passage of laws).  
 115. See Louis Fisher, The Legislative Veto: Invalidated, It Survives, 56 L. & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 274, 288 (1993) (noting that Congress added roughly two hundred legislative vetoes 
to new laws in the ten years after the Chadha decision came down).  
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example, one of the reasons the school desegregation process in the United States 
was so difficult was because courts had to deal with a myriad of different local 
institutions.116 
Moreover, even where political or other actors adjust their practice for the broader 
run of similarly situated cases, rather than just for the single case at issue, they may 
jointly reestablish an equilibrium that does not represent real political or social 
change.117 For example, faced with a ruling that certain forms of explicit racial dis-
crimination are unconstitutional, actors may switch to alternative methods that are 
harder to detect but which produce similar results. Or faced with a ruling that a cer-
tain type of interaction between the executive and legislative branches is illegal, the 
two actors jointly may abandon that approach but instead agree on another one that 
is not very different in terms of its balance of costs and benefits.118 
Relatedly, where courts succeed in altering an equilibrium on a given issue, they 
may also spawn social movements that harm progress on related issues. The basic 
dynamics of this “backlash thesis” are well known: judicial decisions may galvanize 
opposition groups, spurring them to organize and seek channels of political change 
that run contrary to what a court is trying to do.119 Such a story is often told about 
Roe v. Wade120 in the United States, even if this narrative has also been heavily con-
tested121: the Court’s decision may have galvanized opposition groups that worked 
against progress, both on abortion and on other issues of women’s rights.122 
                                                                                                             
 
 116. See, e.g., ROSENBERG, supra note 2, at 85–93 (arguing that little progress was 
achieved in the decade following Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), because 
of resistance from local political officials across different districts, refusals by lower courts 
and state judges to follow the law, and a lack of resources to bring a sufficient number of 
suits).  
 117. See Michael A. Fitts, The Foibles of Formalism: Applying a Political “Transaction 
Cost” Analysis to Separation of Powers, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1643, 1646 (1997) (noting 
that when the Supreme Court makes a decision, actors may employ “informal or other formal 
. . . mechanisms . . . to overcome or effect” that decision).  
 118. See id. at 1652 (discussing the legislative veto).  
 119. See, e.g., Carlos A. Ball, The Backlash Thesis and Same-Sex Marriage: Learning from 
Brown v. Board of Education and Its Aftermath, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1493, 1494 
(2006) (stating that “political and legal backlashes are a foreseeable consequence of contro-
versial judicial victories that require majority groups to reassess in fundamental ways the man-
ner in which they have in the past treated and understood certain minority groups”); Michael 
J. Klarman, How Brown Changed Race Relations: The Backlash Thesis, 81 J. AM. HIST. 81, 
82 (1994) (arguing that Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, set in motion a backlash 
in the South that indirectly led to the civil rights litigation of the 1960s).  
 120. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).  
 121. Substantial recent literature critiques the “backlash” thesis as either incorrect or in-
complete. See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse & Reva B. Siegel, Before (and After) Roe v. Wade: 
New Questions About Backlash, 120 YALE L.J. 2028 (2011) (questioning the Court-centric 
backlash narrative of Roe based on historical data and finding that other institutions were al-
ready engaged in backlash-like dynamics before Roe); Mary Ziegler, Beyond Backlash: Legal 
History, Mobilization, and Roe v. Wade, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 969, 972–73 (2014) (“[T]he 
ideological entrenchment we associate with Roe came later than we have thought and emerged 
for reasons beyond the Court’s decision.”). 
 122. See, e.g., Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation 
to Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. REV. 375, 381 (1985) (arguing that the decision “stimulated the 
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Courts of course have at least limited tools to deal with these problems. They can, 
for example, issue repeated rulings, if necessary, to induce bureaucracies and other 
actors to comply with their orders. They can also issue more structural remedies, 
attempting to change broader bureaucratic practice directly.123 Further, courts can 
develop constitutional doctrines designed to protect against attempted “evasion” of 
their orders through the adoption of different, but similar, equilibria.124 In adopting 
most of these measures, courts are heavily dependent on support from other political 
or social actors. These actors can, for example, act as “support structures” in order to 
bring new cases to the court.125 They can also serve a monitoring function, detecting 
noncompliance with existing orders and bringing new problems to the attention of 
the court.126 Further, resistance from other social and political actors may prevent 
attempts at judicial evasion through the construction of new, but similar, equilibria. 
And finally, supportive actors may create virtuous circles through social movements 
that support a court’s orders and attempt to push them further, rather than movements 
aiming to create backlash.127  
The complement logic is thus largely dependent on more sophisticated forms of 
resistance and inertia that work against judicial rulings, rather than simple and direct 
noncompliance with court orders. And these more complex problems seem to crop 
up across all legal systems; they are not just a creature of countries or systems lacking 
in the rule of law. 
The broader argument seems to rely on a claim that constitutional self-
enforcement is more likely where political institutions function well and a robust 
constitutional culture exists.128 There is probably some truth to this point, but it risks 
oversimplifying reality. Many self-enforcement theories do not rely on actors inter-
nalizing constitutional norms: Madison’s basic theory, for example, relies mostly on 
interests and incentives rather than cultural values.129 Thus, forms of self-
enforcement are quite plausible even in contexts where constitutional culture is weak. 
Moreover, it may be easy to envision cases where external actors do not support 
constitutional values, even where institutions function well and a strong constitu-
tional culture exists. Well-functioning political institutions, working within strong-
party systems, may still behave in ways that do not conform with Madisonian 
                                                                                                             
 
mobilization of a right-to-life movement”). 
 123. See DONALD L. HOROWITZ, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY 6–7 (1977) (tracking the 
emergence of structural remedies seeking affirmative relief in U.S. courts as a way to make 
policy).  
 124. See Brannon P. Denning & Michael B. Kent, Jr., Anti-Evasion Doctrines in Constitu-
tional Law, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 1773, 1776 (defining and finding examples of anti-evasion 
devices, or “doctrines developed by courts—usually designed as standards, as opposed to 
rules—that supplement other doctrines (designed as rules) to implement particular consti-
tutional principles”).  
 125. See EPP, supra note 2, at 18 (“[C]ases do not arrive in supreme courts as if by magic.”).  
 126. See Landau, supra note 61, at 360–62 (noting the ways in which civil society groups 
can extend the capacity of courts to make policy and oversee the state).  
 127. See YOUNG, supra note 70, at 172–73 (calling for a “catalytic” vision of the Court that 
focuses on spurring civil society and governmental actors to seek further change).  
 128. See supra text accompanying note 111.  
 129. See supra text accompanying note 23. 
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expectations.130 And it is unclear the extent to which a strong constitutional culture 
actually will translate into effective constitutional self-enforcement.  
None of this rules out differences in the distribution of the logics across different 
institutional contexts. It is intuitive, for example, that the complement logic is ubiq-
uitous across all legal systems, and across problems of both rights and structure. One 
might ask whether the same is true of substitute-based theories. In some countries, 
for example, it may be that political institutions are dysfunctional enough, and civil 
society weak enough, to make plausible claims of the redundancy of judicial review 
fairly rare.  
D. Finding Substitutes and Complements for 
Judicial Review—A Messy and Uncertain Reality 
The three arguments rejected above play first and foremost a destabilization func-
tion—they suggest that actors cannot rely on simple delineations of the political con-
text in order to figure out whether judges and scholars need to worry more about the 
redundancy or futility of judicial review. The interplay of these two logics is instead 
likely to depend on more complex and contingent features of this context. Analysts 
(and potentially judges) cannot focus solely on broad claims that judicial review is 
likely to be redundant in some areas or national contexts, while being insufficient or 
unworkable in others.  
At the same time, the rejection of simple classifications between the two logics 
may serve a unification function—it may allow us to move towards a more general 
theory of the relationship between external support and judicial review. The main 
value of the scheme laid out here is perhaps in highlighting two major issues, which 
will be the focus of the remainder of this Article. The first is about targeting: whether 
courts can identify and focus on areas where they are likely to have a particularly 
high impact, while giving lesser attention to issues where they are likely to be either 
ineffective or redundant.131 I conclude that this is quite difficult, but perhaps possible, 
at least in a rough sense. The second is the ultimately richer question of whether 
courts can build up support, rather than simply target issues with certain levels of 
support.132 Courts have a number of tools at their disposal that can potentially be used 
to build up support structures, rather than just taking them as a given. The different 
permutations of this ability should be more central to future work on courts and their 
impact. 
III. TARGETING JUDICIAL REVIEW 
A. A Simple Model of Targeting 
There are of course multiple ways in which the substitute and complement models 
may hold simultaneously. In the most pessimistic extreme, the two may meet exactly, 
                                                                                                             
 
 130. See Levinson, supra note 40 (arguing that across a wide range of assumptions and 
institutional orders, many political actors probably do not have incentives to empire-build or 
to resist the empire building of other institutions).  
 131. See infra Part III.  
 132. See infra Part IV.  
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such that judicial review is either redundant or pointless.133 In other words, it may be 
that the contributions of external political and social actors simply swamp those of 
courts. In many cases, courts will be unable to accomplish much because they lack 
the support of political institutions or civil society.134 In the remaining cases, they 
will add no value, because the program they are seeking to accomplish through juris-
prudence would have occurred anyway.135 This description of the relationship in fact 
comes very close to matching the empirical conclusions of a branch of the law and 
social change literature—courts do not matter, at least not very much.136  
As a theoretical matter, this possibility cannot be dismissed out of hand. But the 
pessimistic branch of the social change literature has a fairly cramped vision of the 
influence of courts on political and social structures. It rightly points out that courts 
can do very little alone, but it may overstate the powerlessness of courts to add value 
when combined with the actions of other political actors.137 Part of the problem may 
be that some of these causal pathways may be difficult for social scientists to trace. 
For example, judicial decisions can sometimes have symbolic effects that help 
groups to organize and subsequently influence public policy through electoral or ad-
ministrative politics.138 More generally, it may be difficult for scholars to trace the 
added value of courts when courts are working in conjunction with a number of other 
actors towards a similar goal. 
Perhaps, then, a more realistic map of the relationship between the substitute and 
complement models would be parabolic. Courts face a range of left-tail issues, where 
judicial review is likely to prove fairly ineffective because courts do not have suffi-
cient external political or social support. They also face a range of right-tail issues, 
where judicial review is at least largely redundant on other mechanisms of constitu-
tional enforcement. In between these two extremes are zones where the value added 
of courts is likely to be highest—courts working in this range have sufficient support 
from other political or social actors to be able to accomplish their goals, but not so 
much as to make judicial review unnecessary.139  
Of course, this representation is highly stylized. As noted above, there may be 
contexts where one or the other tail is either completely missing or at least quite 
                                                                                                             
 
 133. See ROSENBERG, supra note 2, at 422.  
 134. See id. at 423 (exploring the failings of desegregation and abortion litigation in U.S. 
politics).  
 135. See id. at 420 (arguing that change in civil rights in the United States depended on the 
involvement of the federal government, and not on the actions of the Supreme Court itself).  
 136. See supra Part I.B (describing the work of Gerald Rosenberg and related scholars). 
 137. See sources cited supra note 65.  
 138. See MCCANN, supra note 69, at 279–81 (telling such a story with respect to pay equity 
litigation); Rodríguez-Garavito, supra note 69, at 1680 (noting that litigation can have sym-
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 139. The relationship posited here is plausible; I make no claim that it is inevitable. It is 
possible, for example, that the relationship between external support and the marginal contri-
bution of judicial review, in some circumstances, is not parabolic but rather monotonically 
increasing. This would occur if courts added more marginal value the more external support 
they possessed.  
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sparse. Existing empirical evidence—admittedly incomplete—suggests that comple-
mentary relationships between courts and other actors are ubiquitous in law.140 In 
virtually any complex context, it seems implausible that courts can be successful 
without at least some significant external political support. It is unclear to me whether 
substitute relationships are similarly ubiquitous. Most “political process” accounts 
stem from U.S. constitutional theory, but it is unclear whether this is due to differ-
ences in political context or just to quirks that have led scholars to seek them out in 
the United States and ignore them outside of it.141  
The intuition of the model, at any rate, is straightforward: courts should aim to 
target areas towards the middle of the curve, rather than the tails. In doing so, they 
maximize the gain from judicial review. And they avoid the twin traps of issuing 
decisions in areas where their actions are likely to fail (the left tail) or are unneeded 
because of very strong forms of external support (the right tail).  
As a normative theory, the question here is whether courts should behave in this 
way, not whether they will in a descriptive sense. But the theory at least makes rea-
sonable (and perhaps incentive-compatible) demands in a descriptive sense. Judges 
plausibly have an interest in making sure that their orders and programs are carried 
out effectively—this gives them an interest in avoiding the left tail of the distribution. 
More broadly, left-tail cases may be ones where courts, by acting in areas where 
other political and social actors are indifferent or hostile, may risk damaging their 
institution. The case for avoiding right-tail cases is not as strong, since ruling in areas 
where external institutions already provide sufficient support may not threaten the 
court in an institutional sense. But if judges aim for an impact on policy, they should 
avoid this part of the distribution because their orders may not result in much of an 
impact.  
B. Doubts About the Model 
1. Should Judges Target? 
One question is whether targeting is a normatively good theory of judicial behav-
ior, both inside and outside the United States. Here one notes considerable tension 
with trends in constitutional theory. Inside the United States, political safeguards 
theories have a long pedigree, and continue to be frequently used in the literature, 
even though they seem to have lost favor with the Supreme Court.142 But broader 
trends in constitutional theory show a move away from institutional and pragmatic 
theories of review and towards more interpretive theories like originalism and textu-
alism. This work privileges “right answers” to constitutional questions and 
deemphasizes contextual and institutional variables stemming from other sources.143 
                                                                                                             
 
 140. See supra Part I.B (giving examples from existing work).  
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 142. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (rejecting a structural safeguards 
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In this light, political safeguards theories increasingly look like something of an ab-
erration. Indeed, many of those calling for judicial enforcement of structural issues 
like federalism and the separation of powers argue that the existence of adequate 
structural safeguards is irrelevant—judges must act on these issues because either 
the original intent or constitutional text, properly understood, requires that 
enforcement.144  
In many ways, constitutional theory in a comparative context outside of the 
United States resembles the interpretive turn in American constitutional theory. The 
particular theories of constitutional interpretation are quite different. Originalism is 
somewhat unusual outside of the United States,145 although important examples of 
its use do exist.146 The dominant theory instead is proportionality, which requires 
courts to methodically weigh competing constitutional values and principles in order 
to resolve difficult problems.147 This is a relatively universalist rather than text-bound 
or nationalist theory of constitutional interpretation, and invites engagement from 
academics and judges across national boundaries.148 But it shares a focus on the in-
ternal heuristics of interpretation, rather than focusing on the ways in which judges 
ought to interact with their political and social environments.149 It is also potentially 
its own form of “right answer” theory—its proponents sometimes assert that judges 
using the proper jurisprudential tools can resolve hard constitutional issues on their 
own terms.150 Targeting theories, at any rate, do not appear to be common outside of 
the United States. The same may be true of other doctrines that sometimes facilitate 
                                                                                                             
 
 144. See, e.g., Yoo, supra note 40, at 1313 (arguing that judicial review in federalism cases 
is necessary because of a read of the “text, structure, and history of the Constitution”).  
 145. See Kim Lane Scheppele, Jack Balkin Is an American, 25 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 23, 
23 (2013) (arguing that originalism “is done almost nowhere else in the world”).  
 146. See Yvonne Tew, Originalism at Home and Abroad, 52 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 
780, 784 (2014) (arguing that originalism has thrived in Malaysia and Singapore); Ozan O. 
Varol, The Origins and Limits of Originalism: A Comparative Study, 44 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L 
L. 1239, 1245 (2011) (demonstrating that the Turkish Constitutional Court has relied heavily 
on originalism).  
 147. See Vicki C. Jackson, Constitutional Law in an Age of Proportionality, 124 YALE L.J. 
3094, 3096 (2015) (noting that the United States is often viewed as an “outlier” in the global 
embrace of proportionality review, but arguing that some elements of U.S. constitutionalism 
in effect mirror that form of review).  
 148. See Lorraine E. Weinrib, The Postwar Paradigm and American Exceptionalism, in 
THE MIGRATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL IDEAS 84, 96–97 (Sujit Choudhry ed., 2006) (locating 
proportionality as part of a “post-war constitutionalism” broadly embraced by many 
countries).  
 149. Proportionality review consists of three sequential parts: legislation must logically 
advance a sufficiently important objective, it must be the least intrusive means (in terms of 
restrictions on rights) to advance that objective, and the actual benefit of the law must exceed 
the harm done to rights-holders. See id. at 96–97.  
 150. See George Pavlakos, Two Concepts of Objectivity, in LAW, RIGHTS, AND DISCOURSE: 
THE LEGAL PHILOSOPHY OF ROBERT ALEXY 83 (George Pavlakos ed., 2007) (comparing a lead-
ing theorist of proportionality, Robert Alexy, to Ronald Dworkin and noting that both believe 
in “right answers” to legal questions, although they begin from premises that are mutually 
incompatible).  
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these theories, such as the political question doctrine.151 This suggests that these the-
ories may be bound up with distinctive pragmatic and institutional elements of U.S. 
constitutional theory, and may not translate as easily to other contexts.  
In addition, while the complement theory has long been popular and influential 
with descriptive analyses of the link between courts and social change (particularly 
those written by social scientists), it seems to have had much less explicit influence 
on courts or judicial decision making even inside the United States. One rarely, if 
ever sees a judge, or even a scholar, argue that judicial enforcement in a given area 
should be ignored or deemphasized because it would be potentially futile. This im-
balance in American constitutional theory—between widespread acceptance of po-
litical safeguards theories but rejection of complement-based theories—perhaps sug-
gests that while ignoring areas of the Constitution that are already seen as adequately 
enforced by other actors is acceptable, abdicating responsibility over underenforced 
constitutional norms is not. The choice may seem particularly problematic given that 
the left-tail cases are likely to be among the most ignored or violated norms in the 
Constitution. 
Put together, these arguments suggest that a pragmatic theory like the targeting 
theory presented here may experience resistance from some judges and scholars, par-
ticularly outside of the United States. But they do not necessarily indicate that a tar-
geting theory is ill founded. Instead, the intuition of the theory seems quite plausible: 
all other things being equal, judges should focus on enforcing those areas of the 
Constitution where they can have a maximum impact. And in order to figure out 
which areas of the Constitution meet those criteria, judges must consider the rela-
tionship between their decision making and external political actors.  
A targeting theory makes particular sense given that judicial resources are scarce, 
and potential grounds and topics of constitutional enforcement will inevitably exceed 
the limits of those resources.152 This is seemingly true even in the United States, 
where the U.S. Supreme Court has experienced dramatic shifts through time in the 
topics as to which it has given its greatest attention, as well as in the size of its 
docket.153 It is even more clearly true in a comparative context. Constitutions found 
elsewhere are often longer, more detailed documents, particularly in the developing 
world.154 In those kinds of orders, the possibilities for constitutional enforcement are 
immense, and the social reality may be quite different from the one envisioned by 
the constitutional project.155 One way or another, judges working in those systems 
                                                                                                             
 
 151. See Jenny S. Martinez, Horizontal Structuring, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 547, 573–74 (Michel Rosenfeld & Andras Sajo, eds., 
2012) (noting that some other legal systems, including the German one, have explicitly re-
jected the political question doctrine).  
 152. See, e.g., Bert I. Huang, Lightened Scrutiny, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1109, 1113 (2011) 
(arguing that “docket pressure can alter the nature of appellate scrutiny”).  
 153. See Margaret Meriwether Cordray & Richard Cordray, The Supreme Court’s Plenary 
Docket, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 737, 738 (2001) (noting a reduction in the size of the Su-
preme Court’s docket over the past several decades).  
 154. See Kim Lane Scheppele, Parliamentary Supplements (or Why Democracies Need 
More than Parliaments), 89 B.U. L. REV. 795, 805 (2009) (noting that many countries now 
have “long, detailed and substantively thick constitutions”).  
 155. See Dennis M. Davis, Transformation and the Democratic Case for Judicial Review: 
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are exercising choice about the kinds of constitutional norms that they want to en-
force. It is reasonable for them to choose topics and cases where they will have a 
relatively high impact.  
2. Can Judges Target? 
This leaves a more difficult question: can judges effectively target judicial re-
view? A first intuition is that here as elsewhere, the United States (and a few other 
systems) may be distinctive. Targeting is possible where high courts have extensive 
powers of docket control, as with the U.S. Supreme Court and some high courts 
found elsewhere around the world.156 But high courts in many countries have less 
power to choose their dockets, and instead are forced to hear cases that meet certain 
criteria.157 Also, some courts contain a large number of members which sit in a num-
ber of different panels, rather than as a plenary.158 Courts with full docket control 
may be able to choose cases to make an impact, and can easily develop a jurispru-
dential program through time. Courts without docket control, with heavy caseloads, 
or with a more fragmented structure may have a harder time following this strategy. 
More fundamentally, the U.S. experience in finding and acting on political safe-
guards theories suggests some doubt as to whether courts actually can identify con-
stitutional topics where review would be either redundant or futile. Existing work on 
federalism, for example, proposes a myriad of competing mechanisms that suppos-
edly make judicial review unnecessary—the national Congress, the party system, and 
the bicameralism and presentment requirements, as a few examples.159 There is a 
potentially vast array of causal mechanisms through which constitutional self-
enforcement can occur, which will likely add complexity to the task of identifying 
these areas. And each of these mechanisms has been persuasively contested in the 
literature, often by authors seeking to debunk alternative theories of self-enforcement 
in order to propose their own. The Court itself has vacillated on this point, accepting 
the political safeguards theory in Garcia before rejecting it several years later in New 
York v. United States.160 
 Some features of the federalism regime may even suggest that, rather than the 
substitute logic, the complement logic may actually be a better fit for at least certain 
aspects of the federalism problem. In other words, the issue may not be that external 
                                                                                                             
 
The South African Experience, 5 LOY. U. CHI. INT’L L. REV. 45, 45 (2007) (stating that the 
purpose of the South African constitution is to “seek[] the transformation of the society 
through the construction of a multicultural social democracy”).  
 156. See David Fontana, Docket Control and the Success of Constitutional Courts, in 
COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 624, 625–27 (Tom Ginsburg & Rosalind Dixon eds., 
2011) (finding that docket control seems to be a common, but not universal practice, and that 
there is little systematic information on docket control across countries).  
 157. See id.  
 158. See Nick Robinson, Structure Matters: The Impact of Court Structure on the Indian 
and U.S. Supreme Courts, 61 AM. J. COMP. L. 173, 184 (2013) (arguing that the Indian Su-
preme Court is “polyvocal” and often lacks coherence because it usually sits in panels of two 
or three justices, rather than as a plenary).  
 159. See supra text accompanying notes 13–20.  
 160. See 505 U.S. 144 (1992); see also supra note 39. 
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enforcement mechanisms make judicial review largely redundant, but instead that 
the absence of strong external support makes judicial review somewhat unlikely to 
achieve major results.161 The fact that state governments are often seen as acquiesc-
ing in assertions of federal power, rather than resisting them, may provide some sup-
port for such an analysis.162 
The point, at any rate, is not to locate federalism enforcement by the U.S. Supreme 
Court at any particular point on the curve—that is a task far beyond the scope of this 
Article, and at any rate different aspects of federalism would almost certainly be lo-
cated at different points. The argument instead is that courts and even scholars have 
had an extremely hard time figuring out where various federalism issues are located. 
That stylized fact, pulled from perhaps the most sustained attempt to target judicial 
review, may give us some pause about recommending it as a general theory.  
C. A Modest Theory of Targeting 
The practical problems laid out in Part III.B ought to lead us to be modest in 
expectations—one cannot put too much weight on a theory of targeting. But the idea 
need not be abandoned.  
The problems of judicial design laid out in Part III.B certainly can make targeting 
more difficult. A court without docket control, which has a very heavy workload, 
and which sits in several different panels may have less ability to prioritize some 
issues while deemphasizing others. But at least to a degree, these strategies can be 
followed even in a court without docket control, through doctrines of justiciability, 
the design of remedies, and similar techniques. Recent decision making by the 
Brazilian Supreme Federal Tribunal (STF) offers an interesting example. The court 
has historically had relatively little ability to limit its docket—one commentator lik-
ens its docket control technique to “drinking from the firehose”—and an extremely 
high workload.163 Nonetheless, it has developed techniques to improve its ability to 
shape public policy on key issues where it might have a high impact. In a very recent 
case, for example, the court declared a state of unconstitutional conditions involving 
                                                                                                             
 
 161. See Landau, supra note 96 (defending this argument with a consideration of compar-
ative empirical evidence).  
 162. See Levinson, supra note 40, at 941 (noting that state citizens may not have strong 
incentives to resist federal regulations as compared to state regulations, and thus that state-
level officials might not care much either). What makes federalism—and perhaps all structural 
dynamics—particularly complex is that the same behavior can be interpreted in many different 
ways. Ryan, for example, observes that much of the balance between state and federal policy 
making is a result of bargaining between the two levels of government. See Ryan, supra note 
20, at 4. It is of course very difficult to interpret the exact dynamics and relationships that 
underlie these bargains, or to assess their normative significance.  
 163. See Matthew M. Taylor, Citizens Against the State: The Riddle of High Impact, Low 
Functionality Courts in Brazil, 25 REVISTA DE ECONOMIA POLITICA 418, 429 (2006); see also 
Angela Jardim de Santa Cruz Oliveira, Reforming the Brazilian Supreme Federal Court: A 
Comparative Approach, 5 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUDS. L. REV. 139 (2006) (noting attempts to 
decrease the STF’s docket, although finding that it did not deal adequately with the fundamen-
tal causes).  
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the prison system, due to systematic overcrowding, mistreatment, and related is-
sues.164 This doctrine, which the court imported and used for the first time, allows 
the court to maintain jurisdiction over the case and potentially to issue a structural 
remedy.165 It also may position it to draft in support from civil society groups that 
will be needed to carry out social change in this area.166 
Broader questions of judicial capacity, of course, must also be taken seriously. 
But even with judicial limitations on the ability to understand the political and social 
context, and inherent uncertainty about the effects of judicial decisions on that envi-
ronment, there are still likely cases where a scholarly or judicial consensus could 
emerge that judicial review is likely to be useless or unnecessary.  
The Colombian example noted above may help to illustrate the potential utility of 
the theory. As noted, the Colombian Constitutional Court has spent tremendous doc-
trinal effort since 1991 to weaken the unilateral powers of its historically hegemonic 
President and to strengthen the national policy-making capabilities of a Congress that 
was historically uninterested in national issues.167 It has sought to cut off a number 
of different routes through which presidents exercised unilateral power or were dele-
gated that power by Congress.168 On the congressional side, it has exercised a rigor-
ous review of legislative procedure in an effort to make the legislature more delibera-
tive.169 The efforts are in accord with the basic theory of the 1991 Constitution, which 
sought to rebalance the separation of powers.170 
But the targeting theory discussed here suggests that at least some of this tremen-
dous doctrinal effort may be misplaced. As a whole, this area looks like one where 
the complement logic is very likely to come into play. Presidents became extremely 
strong in Colombia, and dominated national policy making, in large part because 
                                                                                                             
 
 164. See Vanice Regina Lirio do Valle, An Unconstitutional State of Affairs in the Brazil-
ian Prison System, INT’L J. CONST. L. BLOG (Sept. 25, 2015), http://www.iconnectblog.com 
/2015/09/an-unconstitutional-state-of-affairs-in-the-brazilian-prison-system/ [https://perma.cc 
/M9QQ-BYLQ].  
 165. The court imported the doctrine from Colombia, where it has been used to maintain 
jurisdiction over structural cases. See Rodríguez-Garavito, supra note 69, at 1670 (defining an 
unconstitutional state of affairs as a “massive human rights violation associated with systemic 
failures in state action”).  
 166. See id. at 1685–86 (noting the role that civil society has played, through a Monitoring 
Commission and other devices, in monitoring and enforcing the Colombian judgments).  
 167. See supra text accompanying note 91.  
 168. For an overview, see Landau, supra note 61, at 350–54 (covering judicial attempts to 
limit emergency powers and delegated decree powers); Rodrigo Uprimny, The Constitutional 
Court and Control of Presidential Extraordinary Powers in Colombia, 10 DEMOCRATIZATION 
46, 55–60 (2003) (focusing on the court’s control of presidential emergency powers).  
 169. See David Landau, A Dynamic Theory of Judicial Role, 55 B.C. L. REV. 1501, 1522–23 
(2014) (recounting the court’s attempt to cleanse the Congress of corrupt elements and to improve 
the quality of its deliberations by monitoring and enforcing rules of legislative procedure).  
 170. See, e.g., Manuel Jose Cepeda Espinosa, Judicial Activism in a Violent Context: The 
Origin, Role, and Impact of the Colombian Constitutional Court, WASH. U. GLOBAL STUDS. 
L. REV. 529, 631 (noting that the drafters of the 1991 Constitution “focused on the 
redistribution of functions among the three branches of public power” and “sought to restore 
the equilibrium, which had been altered by the historical prevalence of the Presidential 
office”).  
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Congress allowed these developments.171 Individual members of Congress have had 
incentives to focus on other issues (like the provision of local pork-barrel benefits), 
and parties have been too weak to serve as a counterpoint to strong presidents.172 
Thus the court embarked on an ambitious program to rein in presidential power with-
out the support of Congress, and without much support from other political and social 
actors. Some of this effort may have been better off being redeployed to other issues 
where the court enjoyed more political and social support. In other words, the court 
should consider shifting some doctrinal effort away from the separation of powers 
project embedded in the 1991 Constitution in favor of other key constitutional goals 
like the protection of minority rights and the promotion of socioeconomic justice.  
Another potentially interesting comparative example is posed by so-called sharia 
clauses, which exist in many constitutions within the Muslim world.173 In brief and 
with many important variations, these constitutional clauses require that legislation 
be consistent with principles of Islamic law.174 Existing work on these provisions 
suggests that in many legal orders, judges have adopted flexible readings of these 
provisions, allowing important pieces of social, cultural, and commercial legislation 
to pass muster that might have been vulnerable.175 Some recent work has suggested 
a political logic to these provisions: by packing courts with relatively secular judges, 
political leaders could both recognize and control pushes towards Islamization of the 
political order.176 Without denying the importance of this political logic, it would be 
worth exploring the extent to which judicial deference could be motivated by a view 
that these clauses have adequate structural safeguards from elsewhere in the political 
process. Within political orders that are broadly Islamic, it may be that the political 
branches of government, and not the judiciary, are the best insurance that Islamic 
                                                                                                             
 
 171. See Ronald P. Archer & Matthew Soberg Shugart, The Unrealized Potential of Presi-
dential Dominance in Colombia, in PRESIDENTIALISM AND DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA 
110, 117 (Scott Mainwaring & Matthew Soberg Shugart eds., 1997) (arguing that the delega-
tion of national policy-making power from Congress to the President was a way of advancing 
the interests of members of Congress in patronage-based goals by “freeing members from the 
burdens of making policy”).  
 172. See id.  
 173. See Dawood I. Ahmed & Tom Ginsburg, Constitutional Islamization and Human 
Rights: The Surprising Origin and Spread of Islamic Supremacy in Constitutions, 54 VA. J. 
INT’L L. 615 (2014) (finding a form of these clauses in thirty-eight constitutions); Clark B. 
Lombardi, Constitutional Provisions Making Sharia “A” or “The” Chief Source of Legisla-
tion: Where Did They Come from? What Do They Mean? Do They Matter?, 28 AM. U. INT’L 
L. REV. 733, 734 (2014) (noting the spread of these clauses since 1950). 
 174. The variations are, however, immense: some constitutions make Islamic law a source 
of law, while others make it the paramount source of law. Constitutions also differ in the extent 
to which they bind drafters to a broad corpus of Islamic law or only to certain basic principles. 
See Lombardi, supra note 173, at 772.  
 175. See id. at 771 (noting that in countries where these clauses have coexisted with judicial 
review, “courts seem to apply the law in a manner that is quite deferential to legislative judg-
ment that their law is consistent with Islam”).  
 176. See RAN HIRSCHL, CONSTITUTIONAL THEOCRACY 13 (2011) (finding based on a broad 
survey that courts in “constitutional theocracies” are “bastions of relative secularism” put in 
place by secular and commercial elites to limit the impact of sharia clauses and similar con-
stitutional devices).  
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principles will be taken seriously in the legislative process.177 Court-centric analyses 
of these provisions might therefore miss or even distort their impact. 
IV. THE JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTION OF SUPPORT 
The framework created here makes judicial efforts to build up sources of external 
support important to judicial review. These efforts may allow courts to move along 
the curve hypothesized above (towards the right), rather than be confined to targeting 
particular points on the curve. Moreover, the building up of political support for ju-
dicial decision making should be useful regardless of the point at which a given issue 
is located. If there is currently little support for the Court on a given issue, it can 
improve its position by helping to organize some. And even if the Court already en-
joys significant support for its initiatives, it can potentially benefit from building up 
more. The ultimate goal may be to make support for a given issue self-enforcing, so 
judicial review becomes increasingly unnecessary over time.178  
The approach laid out in this Part most clearly resembles existing work in the law 
and social change literature that highlights the ways in which courts can influence 
their political and social environments.179 My aim here is to go beyond existing work 
by moving towards a typology of the forms of support that courts can seek, and the 
most effective ways to gain that support. Further, I argue in Part IV.B below that the 
judicial construction of support should be particularly central to theorizing about ju-
dicial role in new or fragile democracies. 
A. A Typology of Forms and Strategies 
In a tentative vein, this Part seeks to capture some of the ways in which courts can 
influence their political and social environments. It does not aim to be comprehen-
sive, but rather seeks to demonstrate the potential richness of strategy in this area by 
drawing off of examples from a range of countries and contexts. At the outset, it is 
worth making two important points. The first is that the judicial power to alter the 
political and social environment is limited. Still, in a range of cases even a limited 
power may prove critically important. The second is that all of these techniques, to 
varying degrees, impose costs—they may force a court to compromise on constitu-
tional meaning, for example, in order to draft in support. Whether these costs are 
worth paying can only be figured out case by case. What is clear is that analysts of 
judicial review, and judges themselves, should pay more attention to these 
techniques. 
                                                                                                             
 
 177. See Lombardi, supra note 173, at 172–73 (acknowledging that the impact of these 
clauses depends “primarily on choices by the political branches”).  
 178. As with the targeting theory, the idea that courts should put effort towards building 
up political and social support structures at least seems plausible from the standpoint of de-
scriptive theories of how judges behave. The construction of new forms of support should help 
to protect the judiciary as an institution, and therefore should appeal to judges motivated by 
institutional goals. Moreover, these support structures may serve individual goals (such as 
career goals) of judges and therefore may be appealing even to judges without an institutional 
motivation. 
 179. See supra text accompanying notes 69–73.  
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1. Political Support: Coalition Splitting 
Most obviously, judges may both target and craft their judicial decisions so as to 
help ensure that they have sufficient political support to be successful. Decisions can 
be keyed to split political coalitions. Roux, for example, in a very close look at the 
jurisprudence of the first South African Constitutional Court following that country’s 
transition to democracy, found that the court across a range of issues was far more 
successful than one would have anticipated based on its status as an institution within 
a dominant-party state.180 In part, he found that the court used context-sensitive 
standards of review to identify opportunities to exploit divisions within the dominant 
party African National Congress (ANC), thus forging support within the ruling party 
itself.181 On questions like socioeconomic rights, for example, the court was able to 
craft decisions that drew the support of more liberal, transformational elements 
within the ANC—these elements then aided enforcement of the court’s orders and 
broader projects.182 
Colombia offers a more dramatic example of coalition building. In 2009, the court 
faced the prospect of a powerful and highly popular President, Alvaro Uribe, poten-
tially amending the constitution to run for a third consecutive term in office.183 The 
court had already allowed Uribe to amend the constitution once and seek a second 
term, in 2006.184 But the court declared that a second proposed amendment (via 
referendum) to allow a President to serve for three consecutive terms was invalid, 
both on procedural grounds and because the change was so fundamental that it would 
“substitute” rather than merely amend the existing text.185 For our purposes, the in-
teresting question is why the opinion succeeded—Uribe complied with it and left 
office peacefully. The main reason is again because the court’s opinion split Uribe’s 
coalition. While the President was popular with the public and controlled a super-
majority coalition in Congress, his political majority was made up of a number of 
different movements and individuals, rather than a single strong party.186 The court’s 
                                                                                                             
 
 180. See THEUNIS ROUX, THE POLITICS OF PRINCIPLE: THE FIRST SOUTH AFRICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT, 1995-2005, at 2–3 (2013) (noting that the South African Constitu-
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 183. For background, see Rosalind Dixon & David Landau, Transnational Constitutional-
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 185. See Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], febrero 26, 2010, Sentencia 
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 186. See Royce Carroll & Monica Pachon, The Unrealized Potential of Presidential Coa-
litions in Colombia, in LEGISLATIVE INSTITUTIONS AND LAWMAKING IN LATIN AMERICA 153, 
159–60 & tbl.5.1 (Eduardo Alemán & George Tsebelis eds., 2016) (noting that Uribe’s 
coalition controlled the Congress but was “very fragmented” and contained a number of 
different parties throughout both his terms).  
1318 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL  [Vol. 92:1283 
 
opinion succeeded because it unleashed the ambition of these various factions. Once 
it became likely that Uribe would no longer be allowed to run, the leaders of these 
different movements themselves became committed to seeking the presidency, thus 
weakening the incumbent’s support and making it more difficult for him to defy the 
judiciary.187 
Similar coalition-splitting dynamics have existed with judicial decisions in the 
United States. An interesting example is structural prison-reform litigation, where 
federal district courts in a number of different states attempted to modernize and 
improve inhumane conditions.188 In these long-lasting structural reform cases, Feeley 
and Rubin showed that judges often made progress by co-opting the support of parts 
of the local political establishment and police bureaucracy.189 Courts for example 
framed their interventions as a “professionalization” of prisons stuck in anachronistic 
models, and thus won support from more progressive-minded elements within these 
constituencies, which then aided the courts in carrying out reform.190 Without the 
support of at least some significant elements of the local political establishment, it 
would have been even more difficult for judges to spur changes. 
2. Organizing and Leveraging Civil Society 
Courts also have tools to build up civil society support for their decisions and 
projects. Most obviously, judicial decisions can help to organize and empower civil 
society groups, which may then put pressure on the state. McCann notes the way that 
the litigation process can help to organize groups, although in his narrative of pay 
equity lawsuits in the United States, civil society used the litigation process for 
organizational ends, rather than vice versa.191 Evidence from other forms of structural 
litigation, both inside and outside the United States, amply demonstrates the ways 
that courts can draft civil society groups into their projects. In Colombia, India, and 
the United States, for example, courts issuing structural injunctions have relied for-
mally or informally on different kinds of civil society groups as a source of infor-
mation, as a basis of policy ideas, and as a monitor of compliance by the state.192 In 
complex cases, these groups can be invaluable extensions of a court’s own limited 
                                                                                                             
 
 187. See Dixon & Landau, supra note 183, at 617–18.  
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 189. See id. at 260–61.  
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displaced persons in Colombia).  
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capabilities.193 At the same time, giving civil society groups a role in the litigation 
process may increase their organization and leverage over the state.194 
Recent Colombian structural litigation, which has been widely studied, represents 
perhaps the most developed example of this kind of dynamic. In its two most signif-
icant structural cases, involving internally displaced persons and the national 
healthcare system, respectively, the Colombian Constitutional Court has not only re-
lied on civil society as informal sources of support, but has formalized a key role for 
these groups.195 In both cases, it ordered the creation of a civil society commission 
composed of various organizations.196 It has relied heavily on these groups as a 
source of information about the underlying problems, for ideas about judicial orders 
and the direction of policy, and in order to report on state compliance.197 It has used 
widely publicized (often televised) public hearings, at which both civil society 
groups and state officials testify, to give the groups a chance to influence policy and 
confront recalcitrant state officials.198 In short, the court engaged in a deliberate strat-
egy to increase the power of civil society. 
3. Defining the Beneficiaries of Litigation 
Judges may also be able to alter the scope of their judgments in order to draw in 
additional civil society or public support. A strain of research in political science 
suggests that certain kinds of public policies, once created, are robust against change 
because those policies themselves create constituencies that tend to protect the pro-
gram.199 For example, many social welfare programs may be difficult to dislodge 
because they over time will spawn public and organizational support.200 The amount 
of organizational support may differ depending on the design of the program, how-
ever. For example, relatively universal programs may spawn critical middle-class 
support that protects programs, while means-tested programs targeted at the poor 
may be more vulnerable because they are supported by smaller and less politically 
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powerful groups.201 As a result, public policy makers may have incentives to create 
universal rather than more limited programs even if they are not optimal from a de-
sign standpoint.202 
To some degree and in at least some cases, judges also have the power to modify 
the scope of their judgments so as to manipulate the beneficiary group of their judg-
ments in this way. Socioeconomic rights provide a very rich example. Numerous 
commentators have now noted an oddity: while most assume that the basic purpose 
of having socioeconomic rights is to carry out social transformation by lifting up the 
poor, in many countries and contexts the middle class are major beneficiaries of ju-
dicial decisions enforcing these rights.203 To some degree this may be a result of 
access to justice: the middle class and wealthy are usually more likely to understand 
their rights and to be able to navigate the legal system.204 It may also be due in part 
to judicial incentives: judges themselves often identify with middle-class groups and 
may seek to aid those groups.205 But patterns of middle-class enforcement could also 
serve as an effective strategy, even for a court that was sincerely focused on helping 
the poor. 
By expanding the scope of beneficiaries to include middle-class groups, rather 
than simply the poor, courts may make their rulings more robust against political or 
social backlash. In much the same way as universalizing a social welfare program 
may help to protect it against change, including the middle class as beneficiaries of 
social rights may create a potentially powerful constituency that will then rally to the 
defense of a court’s project.206 The Colombian Constitutional Court’s jurisprudence 
again offers an intriguing example, although it is unclear whether it constituted a 
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 206. See supra text accompanying note 200. 
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deliberate strategy. In targeting the scope of socioeconomic rights like the right to 
health, the court initially focused heavily on whether a petitioner’s right to a vital 
minimum was affected.207 In carrying out this inquiry, the court emphasized the in-
dividual economic circumstances of the petitioner, in effect asking whether the 
claimant was so marginalized that the failure to enforce their rights would place them 
in danger of falling below a minimum level of subsistence.208 But in subsequent 
cases, the court relaxed this requirement, in effect allowing massive individualized 
enforcement of these rights by not only the poor, but also the middle class.209  
The court itself has recognized that this pattern of enforcement has distorted the 
transformational purpose of social rights by diverting resources away from the poor. 
One reason it subsequently issued a structural remedy on the right to health was be-
cause justices on the court felt that existing jurisprudence inequitably aided only 
those who had actually sued and perhaps had regressive class effects as a result.210 
Its structural orders on the healthcare system211 were also aimed at the entire system, 
but included components that prioritized the package of benefits for poorer citizens 
and other elements aimed at helping the poor.212 In other cases and in other areas as 
well, the court has attempted to prioritize social spending for poorer citizens. Its com-
plex structural orders for internally displaced persons,213 for example, were targeted 
mostly at a very marginalized group of the population.214  
But the court’s ability to carry out these transformational remedies has plausibly 
been aided by the strong middle-class support created by its jurisprudence. On sev-
eral occasions, this support was critical in warding off political attacks against the 
court, because powerful coalitions rallied against attempts to weaken an institution 
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Women in Colombia, 49 L. & SOC’Y REV. 5, 6 (2015) (finding that most internally displaced 
persons join “the ranks of the urban poor” and “struggle to survive in informal housing and 
unregulated labor markets”).  
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that had served their interests.215 A more complex question, of course, is in figuring 
out the circumstances under which the distortion created by the manipulation of the 
beneficiary class is worth the gain in political and social support.  
4. Soliciting Support from International Actors 
In some circumstances, support from international actors will be critical to courts, 
either to bolster domestic support or to substitute for it in circumstances where do-
mestic political and civil society support is unobtainable. Judges also have at least 
some ability to rally this form of support. One technique, for example, involves sig-
naling, or crafting decisions so as to send the loudest possible message to interna-
tional organizations that the domestic actions of political or other groups involve 
international issues, violate international law, or otherwise require international 
assistance.  
Relatively recent actions of the Hungarian Constitutional Court offer an interest-
ing example. As numerous scholars have noted, beginning with the sweeping victory 
of a populist right-wing party (Fidesz) in 2010, the country has gone through a sus-
tained process of democratic erosion or abusive constitutionalism.216 Fidesz first 
amended the constitution to weaken the court (a traditionally celebrated and inde-
pendent institution) and other checks on its power, and then replaced the existing 
constitution with a new one that strengthened its power and further eroded demo-
cratic checks.217 In an initial decision from late 2010 where the court was asked to 
hold that one of the constitutional changes enacted by Fidesz (sharply restricting its 
own jurisdiction) was an unconstitutional constitutional amendment, the court re-
fused by holding that it lacked the competence to make the determination.218 But in 
an intervening period before the court was finally packed by Fidesz, it issued several 
decisions striking back against constitutional and legal changes enacted by the new 
majority.219  
My main interest here is in how these decisions were crafted to draft in attention 
and support from the international community. In a July 2012 decision, for example, 
the court struck down (under the new constitution) rules lowering the retirement age 
of judges.220 The decision included references to provisions of international human 
                                                                                                             
 
 215. For a complete overview of these attacks and their responses, see David Landau, Be-
yond Judicial Independence: The Construction of Judicial Power in Colombia 292–315 (Oct. 
2014) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University) (on file with DASH Repository, 
Harvard University). 
 216. For an overview of events, see Miklos Bankuti, Gabor Halmai, & Kim Lane 
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 217. See id. at 139–42.  
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 220. See Alkotmánybíróság (AB) [Constitutional Court] 33/2012 (Hung.), http://www 
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rights law, international standards for judicial independence, and European Union 
(EU) law, and thus seemed designed to draw attention from international actors.221 
Moreover, it was issued at the same time the European Court of Justice (ECJ), the 
high court of the European Union, was considering a challenge to the judicial retire-
ment age provision under EU law. In November 2012, the ECJ held that the law was 
a violation of EU law.222 In two other key decisions from late 2012 and early 2013, 
the Hungarian Constitutional Court first struck down various “temporary” provisions 
that had been added to the new constitution and which created new crimes, new re-
strictions on the right to vote, and new institutions, holding that these “temporary 
provisions” were actually attempted permanent amendments to the constitution and 
were thus inconsistent with the rule of law and constitutional values.223 In a subse-
quent decision, the same court struck down onerous new requirements for voter 
registration.224 In both decisions, as a top Hungarian scholar noted, the court seemed 
aware of its international audience and crafted decisions so as to “speak the language 
of European constitutionalism.”225 
In the Hungarian case, this tactic plausibly bore some fruit because Hungary was 
embedded in a fairly thick network of European and international institutions.226 
Aside from the ECJ and other EU institutions, the Venice Commission of the Council 
of Europe also became heavily involved in evaluating and critiquing the actions of 
the Fidesz regime.227 By April 2013, the court had been packed by the regime, but 
its actions perhaps did help to slow and limit the erosion of democracy that could be 
worked in Hungary.228 
Of course, the same signaling techniques can be used for antidemocratic rather 
than prodemocratic ends. A fascinating but deeply disturbing example is provided 
by the Supreme Court of Honduras, which recently excised the country’s supposedly 
unamendable provision providing for a strict one-term limit on presidential terms 
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from the constitution.229 It pulled off this extraordinary maneuver—gutting part of 
the country’s own constitution—by deploying the unconstitutional constitutional 
amendment doctrine. The court held that the term limit was contrary to higher values 
embedded in international law and the jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights, including the right to a free choice of voters and the right to freedom 
of expression.230 A previous suggestion by a President that the term limit provision 
should be removed via constituent assembly caused significant domestic strife, a 
military coup, and condemnation from the international community.231 But the 
court’s decision largely escaped international criticism.232 The use of a court, and 
particularly a court relying on rather than claiming to flout regional and international 
norms, perhaps helped to signal to the international community that the incident did 
not require much scrutiny.  
B. New Courts and the Construction of Support Structures: 
Beyond the Strong-Form/Weak-Form Divide 
An emphasis on techniques that judges use to build up political and social support 
helps to clarify and refine a high-stakes recent debate in comparative constitutional 
law. This recent debate has focused on the role that judges should play in newer and 
more “fragile” democratic orders.233 Issacharoff argues that courts can and should 
play an aggressive role in these contexts to safeguard democracy, both by monitoring 
electoral politics and by limiting the power of potentially hegemonic parties and 
politicians.234  
Gardbaum, in contrast, has pointed out the risks of courts acting too aggressively 
in “fragile” contexts by showing several cases (including Hungary, South Africa, and 
Turkey) where assertive courts invited political backlash that ended up weakening 
the institutions.235 He has argued that constitutional designers might use various 
                                                                                                             
 
 229. See David Landau, Honduras: Term Limits Drama 2.0—How the Supreme Court 
Declared the Constitution Unconstitutional, CONSTITUTIONNET (May 27, 2015), http:// 
www.constitutionnet.org/news/honduras-term-limits-drama-20-how-supreme-court-declared 
-constitution-unconstitutional [https://perma.cc/DHG5-XPTD]. For the text of the decision (in 
Spanish), see Supreme Court of Justice, Constitutional Chamber (Apr. 22, 2015), http://www 
.poderjudicial.gob.hn/Documents/FalloSCONS23042015.pdf [https://perma.cc/5J7E-8CGH]. 
 230. See Landau, supra note 229. 
 231. See Rosalind Dixon & Vicki C. Jackson, Constitutions Inside Out: Outsider Interven-
tions in Domestic Constitutional Contests, 48 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 149, 159, 175–80 (2013).  
 232. See Brian Sheppard & David Landau, Why Honduras’s Judiciary Is Its Most Danger-
ous Branch, N.Y. TIMES (June 25, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/26/opinion/why 
-hondurass-judiciary-is-its-most-dangerous-branch.html [https://perma.cc/ULX4-9QUN] (noting 
that the court’s decision has “largely slipped under the radar” and referring to the “relative 
silence of the international community”). 
 233. The term is from Professor Samuel Issacharoff. See Samuel Issacharoff, Fragile De-
mocracies, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1405 (2007).  
 234. See ISSACHAROFF, supra note 6, at 12–13 (arguing that in new democracies, constitu-
tional courts can both “provide a critical process limitation on the exercise of democratic 
power” and “eas[e] the transition to a new democratic order” by acting “as a constraint on the 
exercise of consolidated power”).  
 235. See Stephen Gardbaum, Are Strong Constitutional Courts Always a Good Thing for 
2017]   THEORIES OF LEGAL REVIEW  1325 
 
forms of “weak-form” judicial review in order to lessen these risks.236 Weak-form 
design involves instantiating forms of review that lessen the degree of judicial su-
premacy, for example by creating the possibility of political override of judicial 
decisions (as exists in Canada), or by giving judges only the power to interpret stat-
utes to avoid constitutional problems and/or to point out incompatible statutes, rather 
than striking them down (as in the UK and New Zealand).237 Similar techniques can 
and have been developed judicially even if they are not hardwired into the constitu-
tional design. As the South African Constitutional Court has done, judiciaries can 
issue declarations that existing public policy on an issue is not in compliance with 
the constitution, but leave the shape of the solution to the discretion of the political 
branches.238 
The targeting theory developed above suggests that at least the constitutional de-
sign variant of weak-form review may be insufficiently attentive to variations in po-
litical context. The intensity of judicial review should vary in response to the amount 
of political support received by a court, in addition to other variables.239 Thus, a de-
sign approach that forces a uniformly weak form of judicial action may in-
appropriately constrain a court and prevent it from issuing stronger, more aggressive 
decisions in circumstances where the political context will support these decisions. 
A targeting approach shows the errors in a one-size-fits-all solution to judicial over-
reach.240 This suggests that the debate about strong- versus weak-form review has 
focused too much on constitutional design, and would be better suited to more flex-
ible, contextual tools like judicial doctrine, which can be adjusted from case to case.  
In addition, the fact that judges can take actions to build up their support structures 
suggests a missing ingredient in the strong-form/weak-form debate. It indicates that 
scholars should focus more attention on the issue of which forms of review, or other 
tactics, are most effective in gaining support. Issacharoff’s analysis, for example, 
relies heavily on the Colombian Constitutional Court’s famous decision noted above, 
denying the popular Colombian President Alvaro Uribe a third consecutive term in 
office.241 Issacharoff views this case as a paradigm case of proper judicial interven-
tion: the court acted against a powerful incumbent seeking to remain in office indef-
initely, and who might have eroded the country’s still-developing democratic or-
der.242 But he expresses puzzlement as to why the decision worked, particularly 
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since, in his view, the reasoning was not especially extensive.243 The answer, as noted 
above, lay in the political context and the court’s use of that context. By splitting 
Uribe’s coalition, the court’s decision acted as a critical juncture to weaken his seem-
ingly overwhelming political support.244 The court’s success on such a difficult issue 
was a result both of well-targeted judicial review and of judicial craftsmanship de-
signed to peel away some of Uribe’s allies. Thus the comparative vitality of 
Issacharoff’s theory for term limits and other issues depends on what the political 
context looks like on those issues, and whether courts can skillfully work within 
those contexts.  
Gardbaum’s recommendation that emerging courts rely on weak-form review 
raises a related, and unanswered, question: are these forms of review generally ef-
fective in rallying external support for a judiciary? In South Africa, where the con-
stitutional court’s preference for weak-form methods of enforcement is most pro-
nounced on social rights issues, a prominent critique of the court’s work is that it has 
been relatively slow to build civil society and popular support.245 Unlike the 
Colombian and Indian high courts, the socioeconomic rights jurisprudence in South 
Africa has not succeeded in institutionalizing a role for civil society or in giving these 
groups leverage over the state to a great degree.246 The famous Grootboom case, for 
example, sent the question of housing policy back to Parliament, but without requir-
ing or incentivizing groups to pressure the political branches to make policy in a 
certain way.247 Subsequent decisions have required the state to “engage” with civil 
society groups representing potential evictees, but generally in concrete housing dis-
putes, rather than over housing policy as a whole.248  
The weaknesses of the South African Court on this score cannot automatically be 
attributed to all exercises of weak-form review. It may be that there are relatively 
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deferential forms of review that nonetheless are effective at rallying state or nonstate 
actors to a court’s cause. But these questions remain unanswered, and require more 
attention from scholars. The case for weak-form review in new or fragile democra-
cies cannot rest only on avoiding conflict with powerful actors, but must also con-
sider the ways in which courts can build up supportive coalitions over time. To date, 
the weak-form literature has not fully addressed this issue. 
CONCLUSION 
The substitute and complement theories of judicial review emphasize the variety 
of ways in which courts can potentially manipulate their political and social contexts 
in order to maximize their impact and odds of success. In other words, it highlights 
the value of centering a theory of judicial review on the relationship between courts 
and their external sources of support. The rich examples drawn on in the prior Part 
highlight the techniques that courts might use to construct or strengthen political, 
civil society, or international actors that might serve as allies. These tools should 
prove useful across structural and rights-based issues, across both consolidated and 
“fragile” democracies, and across a wide range of political contexts. Of course, the 
analysis in this Article raises a large number of unanswered questions—about the 
feasibility of targeting judicial review, for example, and about the relative efficacy 
of different techniques aimed at constructing a stronger support structure. Those 
questions I leave for another day.  
 
